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iABSTRACT
Preoperative team briefings have been suggested to be important for improving
team performance in the operating room. Many high risk environments have accepted
team briefings; however healthcare has been slower to follow. While applying briefings
in the operating room has shown positive benefits including improved communication
and perceptions of teamwork, most research has only focused on feasibility of
implementation and not on understanding how the quality of briefings can impact
subsequent surgical procedures. Thus, there are no formal protocols or methodologies
that have been developed.
The goal of this study was to relate specific characteristics of team briefings back
to objective measures of team performance. The study employed cognitive interviews,
prospective observations, and principle component regression to characterize and model
the relationship between team briefing characteristics and non-routine events (NREs) in
gynecological surgery. Interviews were conducted with 13 team members representing
each role on the surgical team and data were collected for 24 pre-operative team briefings
and 45 subsequent surgical cases. The findings revealed that variations within the team
briefing are associated with differences in team-related outcomes, namely NREs, during
the subsequent surgical procedures. Synthesis of the data highlighted three important
trends which include the need to promote team communication during the briefing, the
importance of attendance by all surgical team members, and the value of holding a
briefing prior to each surgical procedure. These findings have implications for
development of formal briefing protocols.
ii
Pre-operative team briefings are beneficial for team performance in the operating
room. Future research will be needed to continue understanding this relationship between
how briefings are conducted and team performance to establish more consistent
approaches and as well as for the continuing assessment of team briefings and other
similar team-related events in the operating room.
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1CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Overview and Research Objective
In many high risk environments, for example aviation, team briefings have shown
benefits to individuals and teams by facilitating effective communication (Einav, Gopher,
& Donchin, 2010; Whyte, Lingard, Espin, & Baker et al., 2008). However, compared to
other domains, research on the study of briefings and their effect on surgical teams in the
operating room (OR) is lacking. Whereas, there has been consistent work showing that
implementing briefings positively affects team communication in the OR (Henrickson,
Wadhera, ElBardissi, Wiegmann & Sundt, 2009; Lingard, Espin, Rubin, & Whyte et al.,
2005; Lingard, Regehr, Orser, & Reznik et al., 2008; Papaspyros, Javangula, Adluir, &
O’Regan, 2010) and perceptions of teamwork (Einav et al., 2010; Makary, Mukherjee,
Sextin, & Syin et al., 2007; Papaspyros et al., 2010;), the approaches to performing
briefings are extremely varied and their relationship with outcome variables is still not
well understood. Consequently, a standardized protocol or methodology for conducting
surgical team briefings in the OR has not yet been developed.
In comparison, over the last decade there has been a large body of literature
promoting the implementation of standardized surgical safety checklists which are
suggested to positively impact morbidity and mortality rates by improving teamwork and
team communication in the operating room (Haynes, Weiser, Berry, & Lipsitz et al.,
2009; Lyons & Popejoy, 2014; Russ, Rout, Sevdalis, & Moorthy et al., 2013; Walker,
Reshamwalla, & Wilson, 2012). These checklists include important general information
for teams to remember prior to incision in surgery and often recommend that a team
2briefing should occur. However, the checklists do not prescribe standards for how a
briefing should be conducted. Upon further examination, it may also turn out that pre-
operative team briefings are different from other surgical safety checklist items in terms
of their contributions to the surgical team. For example, surgical safety checklists are
typically aimed at verifying important information, whereas team briefings are meant to
motivate team processes (e.g. communication) and functioning.
Currently, most healthcare facilities only rely on surgical safety checklists and do
not have a separate protocol for conducting separate team briefings. Despite a large body
of research (Gawande, 2009) and an international campaign (Haynes et al., 2009),
surgical checklists have been shown to have variable or low compliance (Rydenfalt,
Johansson, Odenrick, & Ackerman et al., 2013). Thus, even if team briefings are
recommended, they may not be performed at all. This makes it difficult to connect the
quality of the team briefing process to team performance and surgical outcomes. Reasons
for low compliance could be due to a number of issues including lack of perceived
importance of checklist items for the briefing event (Rydenfalt et al., 2013; Tannenbaum
& Cerasoli, 2013), checklist fatigue (McConnell, Farge, & Mocco, 2012), or the checklist
structure not matching how actual briefing events occur in the operating suite (Levy,
Senter, Hawking, & Zhao et al., 2012; Whyte et al., 2008). With the vast amount of
research associating errors in the operating room with poor teamwork (Awad, Faga,
Bellows, & Albo et al., 2005; Greenberg, Regenbogen, Studdert, & Lipsitz et al., 2007;
Halverson, Casey, Andersson, & Anderson et al., 2010; Lingard, Reznick, Espin, Regehr,
& DeVito, 2002; Lingard, Espin, Whyte, Gegehr, & Baker, 2004), surgical teams may be
missing out on important benefits that emerge specifically from team briefings
3(Tannenbaum & Cerasoli, 2013) including decreases in miscommunication (Lingard et
al., 2008; Nundy, Mukherjee, Sexton, & Provonost et al., 2008), increases in team
satisfaction, and reductions in surgical flow disruptions (Einav et al., 2010; Henrickson et
al., 2009).
There have been some efforts to create pre-operative team briefing checklists or
protocols separate from the surgical safety checklists. These protocols have typically
been generalized for all types of surgeries. Recent research suggests that team briefing
checklists or protocols may need to be more specialized to improve perceived importance
and effectiveness (Rydenfalt et al., 2013), likelihood of adoption (Whyte et al., 2008),
and importantly, to reduce the occurrence of surgery-specific non-routine events (Einav
et al., 2010; Henrickson et al., 2009). The use of specialized briefing checklists for
different types of surgical procedures would also mirror how checklists are typically used
in other high-risk environments (e.g. aviation) (Gawande, 2009; Weiser, Haynes,
Lashoher, & Dziekan et al., 2010).  Further, though studies have successfully assessed the
feasibility of implementing a briefing checklist or protocol (Henrickson et al., 2009;
Lingard et al., 2005; Papaspyros et al., 2010), it has been noted in three separate meta-
analyses of the field that there is a paucity of literature regarding “how well” these tools
are used within the healthcare environment (Lyons & Popejoy, 2014; Russ et al., 2013;
Wauben, Lange & Goossens, 2012). This refers not only to implementation fidelity (Karl,
2010; Levy et al., 2012) but also understanding how individual characteristics of these
tools may impact outcomes for the team and the surgical procedure.
The specific goal of this study was to investigate the current practice of pre-
operative team briefings in a surgical gynecology department in order to understand how
4team briefings specifically can prove more beneficial to surgical team functioning and
potentially reduce the occurrence of non-routine events (NREs) (Weinger & Slagle,
2002) in the operating room. Characterizing team briefings as they are now and
identifying how different variables impact their relationship to the occurrence of NREs
also facilitated the development of a model of team briefings for gynecological surgery.
Analysis of the relationship between team briefing characteristics, NREs, and the model
of team briefings were used to provide recommendations towards developing a briefing
protocol for the Division of Gynecological Surgery at the Mayo Clinic.
For this study, pre-operative team briefings will be defined as the period prior to
surgery and the patient entering the operating room where all members of the surgical
team meet to discuss the plans and expectations for the upcoming patient procedure. Pre-
operative team briefings will synonymously be referred to as team briefings and
briefings. NREs, which will be discussed in detail later, refer to any event that occurs
during a surgical procedure which deviates from or disrupts optimal, standard, or
expected work flow (Weinger & Slagle, 2002).
The Challenges for Teams in Healthcare
Teams are becoming an increasingly important aspect of today’s world, especially
in healthcare for which surgical teams are an essential component of safe patient care. It
is important to note that a team is not just a group of any individuals, but cam be formally
defined as a special type of group in which individual team members have specific yet
differentiated roles and are interdependent upon each other to complete their tasks (Salas,
Dickinson, Converse, & Tannenbaum, 1992). Despite the importance of teamwork, teams
5often perform below par due to poor “awareness of team goals, conflicts between team
members, mismatched individual goals, and breakdowns in process and coordination
between team members” (Ashoori & Burns, 2013). Continuing research on the conditions
of healthcare supports the notion that teams and individuals alike may in fact be
performing below their potential (Wauben et al., 2012).
In 1999, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) report informed the world that
approximately 98,000 patients die every year due to preventable medical errors and
adverse events (Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson, 1999). Additionally, it’s been reported
that half a million deaths occur each year in the OR alone as a consequence of an
avoidable adverse event (Gawande, 2009; Weiser et al., 2008). Further, one of the most
often cited causes of error in the OR is team communication (Gawande, Zinner, Studdert,
& Brenner, 2003; Lingard et al., 2002; Lingard et al., 2004). It has been suggested that
the difficulties with team communication in the OR may be due to a lack of
standardization and team integration (Awad et al., 2005).
In response to these findings, there has been much subsequent research in the field
of healthcare to identify strategies used by other high-risk industries, such as commercial
aviation, that can be adapted to achieve and maintain higher levels of safety (Lyons &
Popejoy, 2014; Russ et al., 2013; Wauben et al., 2012). One of the recommendations
made in the IOM report was to implement more rigorous verification processes into
medical practice (e.g., checklists) (Kohn et al., 1999). Although verification of critical
information is important, it doesn’t necessarily promote meaningful team
communication, which has been found to be critical for effective team coordination in
healthcare (Miller, Scheinkestel, & Joseph, 2007). Thus, strategies that not only verify
6information but which can also facilitate team communication have been suggested as
critical approaches to pursue (Wauben et al., 2012).
Typically, these types of approaches are often implemented in the form of
checklists (Wauben et al., 2012), which have been used successfully for teams in aviation
and other high-risk industries since the early 1900s to prevent accidents that could result
from human error (Gawande, 2009; Russ et al., 2013; Wauben et al., 2012). However,
implementing a checklist is “more than checking a box” (Levy et al., 2012) and it’s
critical to not only assess compliance and implementation fidelity of interventions but to
evaluate the quality of such interventions (Levy et al., 2012; Russ et al., 2013).
Overall, operating rooms are becoming increasingly complex and chaotic
environments. Technology is constantly being improved and upgraded. Healthcare
providers are becoming more specialized (Gawande, 2009) and as a result, surgical teams
are growing in size and variability. Surgical teams must take advantage of and optimize
every opportunity in which team interactions occur to reduce the opportunity for adverse
events in the OR, ultimately increasing the capacity to provide safe patient care.
Team Orientation Events in the Operating Room
This research describes an orientation event as a formal opportunity for team
members to interact and communicate in the OR regarding surgical procedures. The term
‘orientation event’ is similar to the concept of ‘communication events’, introduced by
Miller, Miller, Hutchinson, Weinger, and Buerhaus (2008) when describing all verbal
interactions among individual intensive care unit (ICU) employees. Essentially,
communication events are opportunities to achieve common understanding among
7individuals (Miller et al., 2008).  In the OR, interactions take place at the team level and
can vary from verifying and confirming procedures are correct to providing an
opportunity for the surgical teams to exchange information or both (Whyte et al., 2008).
Miller et al. (2008) identified five types of communication events in the ICU ranging
from formal exchanges such as handoffs, to informal exchanges such as two employees
discussing information in passing. Conversely, in the OR, it is suggested that there are six
general occasions during which surgical teams formally interact to complete tasks. These
six events that currently occur in the OR, and that have been discussed in the literature,
include pre-operative briefings, patient sign-in, time-outs, patient sign-outs, post-
operative debriefings, and handoffs. Although these occasions all have different
characteristics, timing, and team members involved, they all serve the same function of
orienting the team to information that is relevant for the current situation. Thus, for the
purposes of this research, these occasions will be referred to as orientation events.
Currently, some orientation events can be aided by a standardized protocol or a
checklist (IHI, 2013; Joint Commission, 2004; WHO, 2009), but some studies have also
suggested that verbal discussion only or the use of visual displays may both be adequate
approaches as well (Einav et al., 2010). Typical characteristics for each type of
orientation event will be briefly described.
The pre-operative briefing should occur before the surgical procedure begins but
the literature varies as to whether this event needs to take place before or after the patient
enters the room and further, if it should occur before or after the patient is under
anesthesia. Whyte et al. (2008) defined pre-operative briefings as “a predictable
opportunity for professionals to exchange information, ensure that any variations in
8routine procedure are made apparent and establish shared situation awareness of how the
case is expected to proceed.” Papaspyros et al. (2010) adds that a “briefing can establish a
platform for common understanding…and provide a structure for collaborative
planning.” As the composition of OR teams can change from day to day, or even between
surgical procedures on the same day, the briefing orientation event can also serve as an
opportunity for team members to introduce themselves and become familiar with the
structure of the team (Russ et al., 2013; Whyte et al., 2008).
The patient sign-in, timeout, and patient sign-out are all events that have been
well documented through research, mostly revolving around the World Health
Organization (WHO) Surgical Safety Checklist (2009). These three events are
opportunities, from the time the patient enters the operating room until they leave, for
verification of important steps that are most critical, known to be often overlooked, and
that put the patient at high risk if omitted (Weiser et al., 2010).  The concept of a timeout
was first introduced by the Joint Commission as a strategy to reduce wrong-site surgeries.
In 2004, the Joint Commission published the Universal Protocol which recommended
that surgical teams take a timeout prior to the first incision and verify they have the
correct patient, correct operative site, and are going to be performing the correct
procedure (Joint Commission, 2004).
Debriefings are an orientation event that should occur immediately following the
surgical procedure. These events are similar to briefings in that it is a time for the whole
team to come together and discuss the previous surgical case (Tannenbaum & Cerasoli,
2013). Debriefings are a time for reflection and an occasion for the team to learn from the
previous surgery (Paull, Mazzia, Wood, & Theis et al., 2010). Importantly, debriefings
9can be used as an opportunity to provide immediate feedback to teams as they can easily
identify near misses, that may not be captured in operating room records, recognize the
underlying contributors, and discuss opportunities for future improvement (Papaspyros et
al., 2010).
Handoffs are a unique orientation event in that they can occur anytime throughout
a surgical procedure and typically take place between two team members who work in
the same role. A handoff occurs when one team member transfers control of or
responsibility for tasks related to the surgical care of a patient to another team member,
and then subsequently leaves the operating room for any given period of time (Blocker,
2012; Cohen & Hilligoss, 2010). There has been much published literature regarding
handoffs (Cohen & Hilligoss, 2010) and most research has promoted the use of
standardized communication documents or checklists, for example the SBAR (Situation,
Background, Assessment, Recommendation) technique, to ensure optimal handoff
performance (IHI, 2013).
The Benefits of Team Orientation Events
Not only are orientation events important opportunities for surgical teams to
interact and share information, but they have the potential to provide many benefits to
team cognitive functioning, team performance, and surgical outcomes. These benefits,
largely facilitated by team communication overall, can include improved team cognition,
shared mental models, shared situation awareness, and prospective memory (Whyte et al.,
2008).
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Each orientation event revolves around communication among surgical team
members. Whereas, poor team communication is frequently identified as one of the main
contributors to medical error in the OR (Lingard et al., 2004; Makary et al., 2007), the
literature suggests that orientation events are effective in improving the quantity and
quality of communication and thus, can potentially reduce medical errors (Awad et al.,
2005; Lingard et al., 2008; Lyons & Popejoy, 2014; Russ et al., 2013). For example,
Wadhera, Henrickson Parker, Burkhart, and Greason et al. (2010) found that initiating
structured communication around critical events for teams in the operating room
alleviates cognitive workload and reduces breakdowns in team communication.
Interactive team cognition (Cooke, Gorman, Myers, & Duran, 2013) accounts for these
improvements in team performance by positing that team cognition emerges from
observable team activities, such as communication. Further, when teams are engaged in
cognitive tasks, such as planning, assessing situations, and decision making, as a team,
their communication reveals cognitive processing (Cooke et al., 2013; Gorman, Cooke,
Winner, & Duran et al., 2007). Thus, it’s not surprising that processes, such as orientation
events, which promote team communication, are successful for improving team
performance and team coordination in healthcare environments (Miller et al., 2007).
Further, analysis of communication can serve as reliable predictors of team performance
(Gorman et al., 2007). Across multiple domains, research has shown that higher
performing teams will exhibit distinct patterns and structure to their communication
(Bowers, Jentsch, Salas, & Braun, 1998; Cooke et al., 2005; Kanki, Lozito, Foushee,
1989; Xiao, Seagull, Mackenzie, Ziegert & Klein, 2003). Effective team communication
has also been shown as a driver for increasing and coordinating other constructs of team
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cognitive functioning including shared mental models and situation awareness (Entin &
Serfaty, 1999).
A team mental model has been described as organized cognitive representations
of a team’s tasks, equipment, roles, and interaction patterns (Cannon-Bowers, Salas, &
Converse, 1993). Thus, a team having a shared mental model would imply that all team
members have common cognitive representations that are important for making
predictions about the current situation (Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Salas & Cannon-
Bowers, 2000; Smith-Jentsch, Cannon-Bowers, Tannenbaum & Salas, 2008). Entin and
Serfaty (1999) have shown that teams who can coordinate shared mental models of the
situation, task environment, and interactions among team members increased a team’s
ability to function effectively under high levels of stress. Further, Miller et al. (2007)
found that team coordination in healthcare relies on interaction between different team
roles through communication. With the constantly changing composition of surgical
teams in the operating room, it would appear that efforts to promote communication
among different team roles during orientation events is critical for improving shared
mental models.
Situation awareness is complementary to and can be described in terms of either
interactive team cognition (Gorman, Cooke, & Winner, 2006) or shared mental models
(Mathieu et al., 2000). As teams are made up of interdependent roles, in order for teams
to be successful, they must maintain high levels of shared situation awareness (Endsley &
Jones, 2012). Shared situation awareness can be described as team members having a
shared understanding of required information that is necessary for the current situation
and a shared understanding of how the current situation may change in the near future
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(Endsley & Jones, 2012). Good shared situation awareness is a critical component in
decision making for medical practitioners (Wright, Taekman,& Endsley, 2004) as it
allows for better anticipation of and adaptation to changes in processes and the
environment (Endsley & Jones, 2012).  Throughout surgical procedures in the operating
room, team members are often busy completing complex tasks specific to their role while
having to maintain an understanding of the larger team task of the surgical procedure.
Research has suggested that communication and coordination processes at the team level
support cognitive team activities such as shared situation awareness (Cooke, Gorman, &
Winner, 2006). Thus, orientation events are critical opportunities for teams to maintain
this mutual understanding among each other with regard to the patient or surgical
procedure (Whyte et al., 2008).
Prospective memory is another important construct that can be supported through
orientation events. Prospective memory is remembering to perform tasks that will be
carried out at a later time (Dismukes & Nowinski, 2006). In prospective memory, there is
a primary distinction made between event-based intentions and time-based intentions
(Dismukes, 2010). An event based intention is a task to be completed when a specific
situation occurs and a time based intention is when a task needs to be completed at a
specific time. Both events are prevalent in the operating room. Research has shown that
reminder cues are one of the most powerful ways to facilitate prospective memory.
Reminder cues can include checklists or standardized team procedures (Dismukes, 2010).
Implementation planning is another powerful aid for prospective memory and this
involves thinking in depth about the tasks to be performed in the future and imagining
additional context including other activities that will be ongoing, environmental cues
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associated with those activities, and potential unforeseen events that could occur
(Dismukes, 2010). Continuing research suggests that support at the team level is
necessary for prospective memory of teams in complex sociotechnical systems such as
healthcare (Grundgeiger, Sanderson, & Dismukes, 2014).
Even though all of the orientation events mentioned above occur in the OR, each
type of event serves a different purpose and is believed to provide a different contribution
to surgical team functioning. Whereas there is potential for significant benefits to emerge
from each event, depending on the methods or approaches used, these contributions may
occur in different ways and to varying degrees.
Previous Research on Orientation Events
The orientation events discussed above are all currently applied in healthcare
practice. However, much of the published literature, especially with regard to surgical
teams, has focused on four of the six events: handoffs, patient sign-ins, timeouts, and
patient sign-outs, the latter three of which are consistently captured within surgical safety
checklists (WHO, 2009). Significantly less research has focused on briefings and how
they impact surgical team performance and outcomes. Whereas briefings are often
recommended by surgical safety checklists, very little is known about the individual
effects of briefings on surgical teams. Further, it is believed that briefing orientation
events may contribute or have the potential to contribute different benefits to the surgical
teams. For example, the primary goal of orientation events included within a surgical
safety checklist is to verify important patient-related information (Haynes et al., 2009;
Weiser et al., 2010) whereas team briefings are aimed at identifying and creating a shared
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understanding for how the case is expected to proceed (DeFontes & Surbida, 2004;
Whyte et al., 2008). Thus, the team briefing orientation event deserves and requires
separate research into understanding how it can prove more beneficial to surgical team
functioning. Accordingly, this also implies that team briefings will likely necessitate
separate methodology or protocols for conducting these orientation events in the
operating room.
The Impact of the Surgical Safety Checklist. As stated previously, much of the
published literature on orientation events has concerned handoffs or the patient sign-ins,
time-outs, and patient sign-outs within the context of surgical safety checklists. Very little
is known about surgical team briefings. Even though they are often recommended within
checklists, briefings have been slow to be adopted in healthcare (Henrickson et al., 2009).
Surgical safety checklists, on the other hand, have experienced widespread adoption and
acclaim in a short amount of time (Weiser et al., 2010). To better understand the impact
of these prevailing orientation events included in surgical safety checklists, literature
review was conducted. The goal was to identify what has been accomplished to date, if
and when briefings played a role in these checklists, and what weaknesses or limitations
exist. Because handoffs are a unique orientation event, usually occurring between only
two team members at any given time during the surgical procedure, they were not
reviewed for this proposal.
The first widely disseminated surgical safety checklist for the operating room was
the Universal Protocol, published by the Joint Commission in 2004 (Appendix A). Prior
to this checklist, it was reported that wrong-site surgeries were occurring as often as 40
times per week in the United States (Joint Commission, 2004). Wrong-site surgery can
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include wrong site, wrong patient, wrong procedure, or wrong side surgeries (Joint
Commission, 2004). The Universal Protocol was designed to be a one-page checklist for
verification of critical steps towards performing correct site surgery. One important
contribution by the Universal Protocol was the popularization the “time-out” concept.
Essentially, this checklist required the surgical team to pause prior to incision, or take a
“time-out”, and verbally confirm the identity of the patient that they were operating on
the correct site, and were performing the correct procedure (Joint Commission, 2004).
The protocol attempts to promote teamwork by requesting that all immediate members of
the surgical team are present and that they actively communicate during the time-out
(Joint Commission, 2004). However, with the only requirement being to verify the
correct patient, site, and side, the Universal Protocol lacks cues that stimulate meaningful
dialogue. Further, the timeout typically occurs after the patient is already under
anesthesia so waiting until then to prompt any lengthy team communication could cause
unnecessary delays in the surgical procedure. The Universal Protocol did not recommend
any team discussion prior to the start of the surgical procedure.
Following the introduction on the Universal Protocol the use of surgical checklists
continued to grow, expanding upon the concept of the timeout, and began to show
positive impacts on surgical team functioning. These checklists were mainly aimed at
creating standardized communication for orientation events which were associated with
fewer team miscommunications during surgical procedures (Lingard et al., 2005; Nundy
et al., 2008) and improved team perceptions of coordination and decision making
(Lingard et al., 2008; Makary et al., 2007; Whyte et al., 2008). This research continued to
illustrate the importance of initiating communication for surgical teams.
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In 2009, a team of experts in surgery, anesthesia, nursing, infection control,
human factors, and quality improvement worked together publish and disseminate the
WHO Surgical Safety Checklist (Haynes et al., 2009; Walker et al., 2012) (Appendix B).
This checklist was created in response to the WHO’s Patient Safety Programme initiative
of improving the safety of surgical care around the world (Haynes et al., 2009; Weiser et
al., 2010). The WHO Surgical Safety Checklist was designed to be generalizable for any
operating room in the world and consists of three main phases including: 1) the Sign In,
which occurs once the patient has entered the room but before induction of anesthesia, 2)
the Time Out, which occurs just before the surgical incision, and 3) the Sign Out, which
occurs before the patient leaves the operating room. The developers recognized from
aviation that opportunities for orienting a team, in this case using a checklist, should be
designed around operational work flow patterns and not in place of them (Gawande,
2009; Weiser et al., 2010). This was the rationale behind the three phases of the checklist,
which were identified as already established “natural pauses” in the surgical workflow
(Weiser et al., 2010).The sign-in phase occurs after the patient enters the room and before
anesthesia is administered and involves verifying and confirming information regarding
correct patient, site, and side as well as patient allergies and anesthesia checks.. The time-
out phase occurs after anesthesia right before the skin incision. During this phase, team
members are asked to introduce themselves by name and role followed by a traditional
time-out, per the Universal Protocol. Next there are a number of tasks that are designed to
promote team discussion regarding the expectations and concerns regarding the patient or
surgical procedure. Finally, during the sign-out phase equipment counts are completed,
17
specimens are checked for correct labeling and an opportunity is provided for the team to
discuss any equipment problems that arose during the surgery.
The developers incorporated principles of user-centered design to ensure this
checklist was easy to use, for example by keeping the length succinct, ensuring language
was simple and clear, and limiting clutter and color (Weiser et al., 2010). Aside from
striving for exceptional user-centered design and usability, the WHO conducted the most
comprehensive evaluation of surgical checklists to date (McConnell et al., 2012) to
determine the effectiveness of the checklist. The WHO Surgical Safety Checklist was
initially piloted in 8 hospitals worldwide with varying economic circumstances and
populations (Haynes et al., 2009). Following implementation of the checklist, it was
found that rates of mortality and inpatient surgical complications decreased significantly
by .7% and 4% respectively (Haynes et al., 2009).
Since the launch of the WHO Surgical Safety Checklist over 4000 hospitals
across the world have adopted and actively use the checklist in their facility (Walker et
al., 2012) and its use is endorsed by national and international healthcare safety
organizations (Joint Commission, 2004; WHO, 2009; IHI, 2013). However, subsequent
research findings have identified weaknesses with the implementation fidelity of the
WHO surgical safety checklist suggesting that the checklist is not always applied as
intended (Levy et al., 2012; Rydenfalt et al., 2013). Overall, multiple studies have
reported compliance rates between 60-80% and as low as 53% for the sign-in, time-out,
and sign-out phases (Fourcade, Blache, Grenier, Bourgain & Minvielle, 2012;
Henderson, Fung, Bhatt, & Bdesha, 2012; Levy et al., 2012; Rydenfalt et al., 2013).
Despite the capability of the WHO checklist to decrease mortality and improve aspects of
18
surgical teamwork, van Klei, Hoff, and Aranhem et al. (2012) revealed that these benefits
are dependent on full checklist completion.
Although it is apparent that the WHO checklist is trying to support orientation
events that promote team discussion and establish a shared understanding for the surgical
procedure, there are three issues with its approach to doing so and these may be reasons
why implementation fidelity is a problem.
The first issue is one of timing. Information sharing and communication are
important contributors to team cognition, shared mental models, and situation awareness
(Cooke et al., 2013; Entin & Serfaty, 1999; Mathieu et al., 2000). Waiting to initiate team
communication until the time-out phase of the WHO checklist when the patient is already
under anesthesia seems like an untimely approach to establishing these constructs.
Inappropriate timing of checklist items has been shown as a barrier to adoption of
checklists and is also correlated with poor checklist compliance (Fourcade et al., 2012;
Levy et al., 2012). Further, promoting lengthy conversation with a patient under
anesthesia could not only reduce the likelihood that teams will engage in meaningful
communication but it could also result in surgical delays. For example, if it is determined
that a special piece of equipment will be needed and this is not  discovered until the time-
out, there could be a significant delay in the surgical procedure while the circulating
nurse retrieves the equipment and the certified scrub technician opens, examines, tests,
and assembles the equipment. Promoting communicating regarding expectations (e.g.
special equipment needs) and concerns during a team briefing, prior to the start of the
surgical procedure, may be better than waiting until the time-out. Additionally, the
surgical safety checklist requires teams to introduce themselves during the time-out.
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Whereas research has shown that this in an effective method for “promoting an
individual’s sense of participation and responsibility and increases the probability that
individuals will speak up if they anticipate or detect a problem” (Russ et al., 2013), these
benefits may be hindered by another case of poor timing. At the point of the time-out,
team members have likely already been working together prepping the operating room
and completing the patient sign-in for up to an hour. As such, this item may seem
irrelevant or extraneous to team members completing the checklist. Introductions of team
members would be more appropriate during a team briefing prior to the start of the
surgical procedure.
The second issue relates to team participation. The WHO checklist does not
involve all of the team members at any its three orientation events (i.e., patient sign-in,
time-out, patient sign-out), except where they are all requested to introduce themselves.
Action items for discussion are only explicitly given to the surgeon, nurse, and
anesthesiologist, which may discourage other critical team members (e.g. certified scrub
technician, certified surgical assistant, certified registered nurse anesthetist, resident)
from voicing opinions or concerns. Rydenfalt et al. (2013) suggests that to obtain full
participation and compliance there must be a perceived relevance of checklist items for
all team members.
The third issue is one of generalizability. The WHO has actually sent a
contradictory message by aiming to create a generalized and standard methodology for
certain orientation events (Haynes et al., 2009). However disclaimers have been added
promoting the modification of the WHO checklist (i.e., only adding to, not removing
items) to meet local facility needs (Haynes et al., 2009; Weiser et al., 2010). Between and
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within any surgical specialties, there are vastly different procedures that can occur within
the same operating room on any given day and requiring different compositions of
surgical teams. For example, gynecology procedures can include open cases, robotic
cases, and laparoscopic cases. Each of these procedures requires different information for
each team member. If cues are not present to prompt discussion or concerns that are
specific to different surgical procedures, errors of prospective memory may occur
(Dismukes, 2010).
In an attempt to improve upon shortcomings of the prevailing surgical checklists,
a Dutch group of researchers developed a checklist using a methodology that follows
patients from admission to discharge (deVries, Hollmann, Smorenburg, Gouma &
Moermeester, 2009). This checklist, called the Surgical Patient Safety System
(SURPASS) is more comprehensive than the WHO Surgical Safety Checklist as it
encompasses the entire surgical pathway (deVries et al., 2009; McConnell et al., 2012).
The premise for such an elaborate checklist came from a previous study conducted by the
same group (deVries, Smorenburg, Gouma, & Boermeester, 2008). In observing over 170
patients undergoing surgery, deVries et al. (2008) found that 50% of observed incidences
actually occurred before or after the surgical procedure. Thus, the SURPASS was
developed and piloted in six different hospitals (deVries et al., 2009). After the
implementation period, there was a 5% decrease in number of complications for in-
hospital patients and a decrease in surgical mortality rates from 1.5% – 0.8%. A hallmark
of this checklist implementation study, which added valuable validity for the SURPASS,
was the inclusion of a control group (deVries et al., 2009; Walker et al., 2012). In 5
control hospitals, there were no significant changes in outcomes during the same period
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of time the SURPASS was implemented (deVries et al., 2009). This study not only
reaffirmed the positive impact that checklists can provide for teams during orientation
events, but more importantly, it provided evidence for the need to focus teamwork-
oriented efforts before and after the surgical procedure as well.
Surgical safety checklists have been successfully adopted on a widespread level
(Walker et al., 2012). They have been shown to be beneficial for communication and
teamwork (Lyons & Popejoy, 2014; Russ et al., 2013). Although these checklists have
quickly become the standard of care in the operating room (McConnell, 2012), there are
still weaknesses and missed opportunities to increase communication and improve shared
understanding and team coordination, which could be accounted for by implementing a
team briefing prior to the surgical procedure.
Outcome Measures for Orientation Events: The Role of Non-Routine Events. Most of
the research to date on orientation events has looked at distal outcomes to evaluate the
effectiveness of any intervention. These outcomes usually include morbidity and
mortality rates (deVries et al., 2009; Haynes et al., 2009). Whereas these measures are
extremely important they often require large scale studies with a high number of
participants to see significant results and larger adverse events such as death do not occur
that frequently. Further, these distal outcomes do not reveal much about the effectiveness
of the intervention within a given surgical procedure, which is equally important to
understand (Burtscher, Wacker, Grote, & Manser, 2010). Thus there is a need for more
proximal outcome measures with regards to orientation events. To accomplish these
requirements, the outcome measure used in this research was non-routine events.
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The term non-routine event (NRE) was introduced by Weinger and Slagle (2002)
as ‘any event that is perceived by care providers or skilled observers to be unusual, out-
of-the-ordinary, or atypical’ during surgical procedures. Initially, NREs were used to
retrospectively analyze work flow disruptions in anesthesia teams (Weinger & Slagle,
2002). Since then, NREs have been used to assess surgical flow of cardiac surgery teams
(Henrickson Parker, Laviana, Wadera, Wiegmann, & Sundt, 2010; Wiegmann,
ElBardissi, Dearani, Daly, & Sundt, 2007), trauma teams, (Blocker, Duff, Wiegmann, &
Catchpole, 2012) and in preliminary studies of team performance in the OR (Schraagen,
Schouten, Smit, & Haas et al., 2010; Schraagen, Schouten, Smit, & Haas, 2011). The
term NRE is also used synonymously with surgical flow disruptions (Blocker et al., 2013;
Catchpole et al., 2013; Wiegmann et al., 2007).
Traditionally, all patient safety research methods have relied on “hard patient
outcome variables” (Weinger, Slagle, Jain, & Ordonez, 2003) such as adverse or sentinel
events. Weinger et al. (2003) explains, “…the root causes of most adverse events are
systemic factors such as dysfunctional organizational structure, inadequate training,
faulty communication, or poorly designed medical device user interfaces.” Thus, these
factors are essentially latent errors that may only result in larger adverse events through
very specific coincidental occurrences of related events (Reason, 1990). Consequently,
Weinger et al. (2003) suggests that it is important to use alternative data collection
strategies that can examine these smaller “non-routine events” which may reveal basic
latent errors that are present within the current system. Further, as adverse events are
usually very specific to a given event and occur rarely, they make it difficult to collect
additional and generalizable data about healthcare processes.
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The construct of NREs have become attractive as an outcome measure of team
performance in the operating room for a number of reasons. First, NREs allow
researchers to study underlying system processes without the negative connotations of
“medical error” (Weinger & Slagle, 2002). Second, Wiegmann et al. (2007) found that
greater occurrences of surgical flow disruptions led to increases in surgical errors. Thus,
NREs have a clinical significance that other objective measures cannot provide. Third,
there are validated tools available for collecting, categorizing, and analyzing NREs
(Blocker, Eggman, Zemple, Wu, & Wiegmann, 2010; Henrickson Parker et al., 2010).
Fourth, understanding the frequency and nature of NREs in relation to teamwork allows
for the development of evidence-based interventions (Blocker et al., 2012; Wiegmann et
al., 2007).
Recently, Blocker (2012) identified NREs as an effective outcome measure for
intraoperative handoff orientation events. In this study, Blocker (2012) found that
inefficient handoffs during cardiac surgery can create NREs which could result in
compromises to patient safety. The results from this study led to the development of more
effective methodologies for intraoperative handoff orientation events (Blocker, 2012).
This study illustrates the viability of and potential for using non-routine events to assess
and improve upon orientation events in the operating room.  Further, some initial work
has been accomplished tying non-routine events to briefing orientation events (Einav et
al., 2010; Henrickson et al., 2009). The implications of these studies will be discussed in
the following section.
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Previous Research on Team Briefings
The need for team briefings in surgeries is apparent and upon review of the
literature there has been a number of studies accomplished focused solely on
implementing surgical team briefings. In fact, surgical team briefings have been
mentioned in the literature for the last decade (DeFontes & Surbida, 2004). However,
there is still a great deal of variability in how team briefings are performed and the
outcomes with which they have been validated. Again, most research has only focused in
feasibility of implementing briefings (Einav et al., 2010; Henrickson et al., 2009; Lingard
et al., 2005; Makary et al., 2007; Nundy et al., 2008) or team perceptions of briefings
(Carney, West, Neily, Mills & Bagian, 2010; Makary et al., 2007; Papasypros et al.,
2010) and not necessarily on understanding how the quality of or variations in briefings
impact outcomes. Unlike the orientation events in surgical safety checklists, there lacks a
consistent and dominant approach for briefings and consequently, a standard best practice
or methodology does not yet exist.
A common approach for implementing team briefings has been to hold them in
conjunction with the time-out procedures. Makary et al. (2007) implemented a 2-minute
OR briefing to be conducted after the patient was anesthetized and before the first
incision. The briefing (Appendix C)  included 3 critical steps: the OR team members
introducing themselves, the surgeon leading a timeout, per the Universal Protocol
standards, and a discussion regarding potential safety hazards (Makary et al., 2007).
Using a pre-post implementation study design, Makary et al. (2007) used surveys to
determine that team briefings significantly reduced perceived risk of wrong-site surgeries
and improved perceptions of team collaboration. In a later study by the same group, it
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was found that implementation of the 2-minute OR briefing also reduced self-reports of
delays in the operating room by surgical team members (Nundy et al., 2008). Although
the findings from these studies are promising, the outcomes mainly rely on self-reports
which are inherently subjective and may not correlate with actual team improvements. By
holding a briefing in conjunction with the timeout orientation event, teams will have
experienced the same limitations as previously discussed (e.g. lack of established shared
mental models and situation awareness).
Lingard et al. (2005) was one of the first studies to assess implementing a briefing
prior to the surgical procedure. In this study, the feasibility of implementing a pilot
briefing was examined. Lingard et al. (2005) developed a checklist to guide and prompt
team communication for the briefing. The checklist (Appendix D) was comprehensive,
including space for recording briefing attendance, patient information items to verifying
(e.g. diagnosis, history, allergies, etc.), and in-depth talking points concerning operative
issues (e.g. procedure, operative plan, patient positioning, expectations). The briefing
checklist was implemented and usage was observed in 18 vascular surgical cases
(Lingard et al., 2005). Ethnographic notes and brief feedback interviews were used to
determine that a preoperative briefing checklist is in fact a feasible tool to initiate surgical
team communication regarding procedural issues before a surgical case (Lingard et al.,
2005).
In a subsequent study by the same group, communication failures were observed
in pre-post implementation study design (Lingard et al., 2008). In this study, 172
procedures (86 pre- and 86 post-intervention) were observed by trained researchers using
a validated scale for collecting data on communication failures and their visible
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consequences (Lingard et al., 2008). The results from this study revealed that
implementation of the briefing significantly reduced the number of observed
communications failures per procedure. This study was important as it was one of the
first to connect team briefings to an objectively measurable outcome. However, there
were issues of skewed data in the post-intervention observations (Lingard et al., 2008).
Additional limitations of this study include the fact only 3 team members participated in
the briefing on average and the timing of the briefing was not standardized. Only 23% of
the briefings occurred prior to the patient entering the room and almost half (47%)
occurred after the patient was anesthetized (Lingard et al., 2008). Variations in these
briefing characteristics may result in differential effects on team performance. For
example, if the briefing does improve team cognition and facilitate shared situation
awareness, and the briefing is not conducted until after the patient under anesthesia, there
may be inconsistencies in team performance up to that point.
A study by Papaspryos et al. (2010) illustrates the variation in approaches for
conducting team briefings. In this study, there were three steps of the briefing identified
(Appendix E), the first being a “General Step Process” where the team is introduced and
the surgeon leads a discussion regarding the expectations for the procedure (Papaspryos
et al., 2010). The second step is referred to as the briefing step; however its purpose is
more akin to a timeout as the team is required to verify patient information, allergies, etc.
The third step is to conduct a debriefing process following the end of the surgical
procedure (Papaspryos et al., 2010). Following implementation, it was found that the
briefing improved perceptions of teamwork and communication (Papaspyros, 2010).
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Although these results are good news for briefings in general it leads one to
question how briefings that are conducted very differently still achieve similar positive
results. What is it about the briefing that leads to better quality?  Further, are there more
objective outcomes that can be used to assess this quality?
Henrickson et al. (2009) was seemingly the first study to develop a specialty-
specific briefing and evaluate its implementation using surgical flow disruptions, a
clinically objective outcome measure (Wiegmann, 2007). The researchers acknowledged
that despite briefings generally being accepted as useful, they have not been widely
implemented which could be due to a lack of specialized and standardized protocols
(Henrickson et al., 2009). Thus, Henrickson et al. (2009) developed a briefing protocol
specifically for cardiovascular surgery (Appendix F). This study used focus groups with
actual surgical team members to design a protocol for team briefings. Following
implementation, there was a significant decrease in surgical flow disruptions, which
included patient-related errors, equipment issues, procedural knowledge, and
miscommunication events (Henrickson et al., 2009). This study was important for
furthering the field of briefings research for three reasons. First, this study corroborated
existing evidence that it is feasible to implement team briefings that will be accepted by
staff and result in improved perceptions of teamwork. Second, this study introduced the
need and provided rationale for surgery specific protocols. Based on the assumed benefits
provided by orientation events in general, surgery-specific protocols would likely
increase perceived relevance for team members and thus, better support team cognition,
shared mental models, situation awareness and prospective memory for that given
surgery. Additionally, briefing information that is relevant may be more effective in
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preventing disruptions or errors in the subsequent surgery. Third, the researchers were
able to use an objective outcome measure (e.g. surgical flow disruptions) to effectively
assess the clinical impact of the surgical team briefing implementation.
Despite the contributions from these research results, this study was not without
its weaknesses. Whereas Henrickson et al. (2009) did evaluate the feasibility of
implementing team briefings, they did not assess the quality of briefings. They did
capture some briefing characteristics, for example the fact that during the “roll-in” period
before briefings were evaluated, the length of time required to perform  a briefing
dropped consistently from 8 minutes to 1 minutes (Henrickson et al., 2009). Yet, these
variations in how briefings were conducted were not related back to outcome measures. It
would be interesting to know whether the length of the briefings or other characteristic
nuances had any impact on briefing quality. Further, the researchers only assessed the
impact of briefings on the first case of the day. While this was a deliberate choice in
methodology for this study, one could assume that if only one briefing occurs in the
morning for all surgical cases throughout the day, procedures later in the day may
experience more surgical flow disruptions.
Finally, there was a recent study by Einav et al. (2010) that used non-routine
events as an outcome measure for implementing surgical team briefings; although, once
again a different approach to the briefing procedure was used. Following an extensive
observation period of 130 surgeries conducted without briefings, Einav et al. (2010)
developed a generic briefing protocol in the format of a poster (Appendix G) that could
hang on any operating room wall. The goal was to create a tool that was more “accessible
and salient” than a paper checklist (Einav et al, 2010). Another difference in this
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approach was that the briefing was to be conducted in the operating room while the
patient is still awake, prior to anesthesia (Einav et al., 2010). Following implementation
of the briefing protocol, researchers conducted prospective observations in the operating
room, finding a 25% reduction in the occurrence of non-routine events from when there
was no briefing at all (Einav, et al., 2010).
The findings from this study are important because they emphasize the ability for
non-routine events to correlate with effects of team briefings. However, the researchers
did not use validated methods (Blocker et al., 2010; Henrickson Parker et al., 2010) for
capturing or categorizing non-routine events. Instead the researchers created categories
by consensus based on the data collected (Einav, 2010). Further, the use of a visual
cognitive aid to guide the briefing seems to be a promising approach for prompting team
communication (Einav et al.). However, conducting the briefing in the room with the
patient awake could inhibit the team from engaging in meaningful conversation and fully
disclosing expectations or concerns for the upcoming surgery.
Overall, a solid foundation of work has been building in the field of surgical team
briefings. However, there is still too much variation in the approaches and methodology
for conducting the briefings and in the outcomes used to evaluated their effectiveness.
Further, no work to date has been accomplished to understand the relationship between
individual briefing variables and objective outcomes.
Purpose of Present Study
Whereas there has been much study of the orientation events that occur in the
operating room during surgical procedures, there has been significantly less research
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regarding the team briefing orientation event and its impact on subsequent surgical
procedures. Further, the research that has been accomplished has focused mostly on
compliance and feasibility of implementation. No research to date has related specific
characteristics of team briefings (e.g. who led the briefing, who was present, who
contributed, how long it lasted, etc.) to the quality of teamwork (Russ et al., 2013).
Understanding how the quality of a team briefing and/or variations in practice impact
team-related outcomes is necessary for designing effective methods (e.g. checklists or
protocols) to improve the process. Therefore, the purpose of the present research study
was to evaluate pre-operative team briefings and gain a deeper understanding of the
relationship between variations in quality and team performance in gynecological
surgery.
Following are the specific aims of this research study:
1. Identify the characteristics of team briefings during gynecological surgeries.
2. Identify the characteristics of non-routine events during gynecological surgeries.
3. Describe the relationship between characteristics of team briefings and non-
routine events for gynecological surgery.
4. Develop a model of team briefings for gynecological surgery.
To address the first aim, prospective observations of gynecological surgeries and
cognitive interviews with individual surgical team members were performed in an
attempt to answer several basic questions regarding team briefings. The interviews gave
the researcher an opportunity to understand the knowledge that individual team members
had regarding briefings and what informational needs were required from the briefings.
Thus, conducting the interviews sought to answer the following questions:
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a) When and how should a team briefing occur?
b) How long should a briefing last?
c) What team members should be involved in the briefing?
d) What information is important to discuss at a briefing and do these needs vary by
role?
e) What are the critical steps involved in a good team briefing?
The purpose of the prospective observations was to get an accurate picture of how
briefings actually occur. Thus, conducting the observations sought to answer the
following questions:
a) Does a briefing always occur?
b) How long does the briefing last?
c) What team members are present for and actively involved in the briefing?
d) What does the communication look like (e.g. structure, frequency, number of
questions asked)?
To address the second aim, prospective observations of gynecological surgeries were
conducted to identify and categorize the occurrence of non-routine events. The data were
used to answer several basic questions regarding non-routine events. These questions
included:
a) How often do non-routine events occur per case?
b) What types of non-routine events occur?
c) Which types of non-routine events occur most often?
d) What is the impact (severity) of non-routine events on the surgical team or the
patient?
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e) Which role on the surgical team is impacted the most?
To address the third aim, quantitative analysis of the data was performed to address
the following questions:
a) Are specific characteristics of team briefings associated with any characteristics
of non-routine events (e.g. longer briefing is correlated with less non-routine
events per case)?
b) Is the difficulty of the case, as rated by surgical team members, associated with
team briefing or non-routine event characteristics?
c) Are team ratings of “how well did the surgical procedures match the expectations
team members had based on the information provided at the team briefing”
associated with team briefing or non-routine event characteristics?
To address the fourth aim, quantitative methods were used to develop a model for
team briefings in gynecological surgery. The primary goal for this aim was model
development, but a secondary goal was to determine the predictive ability of the model.
The specifics of the methodology used to develop the model and test its predictive
capacity will be described in more detail in the following sections.
Significance of Study
The present research study contributes to the field of human factors and
healthcare. This study is the first to assess the quality of pre-operative team briefings and
its relationship to subsequent surgical procedures. No research to data has related specific
characteristics of team briefings back to the quality of teamwork and objectively-
measured outcomes. Accordingly, this work has provided further evidence of the value of
33
using non-routine events as an outcome measure in healthcare research. Further, this
research will be the first to develop a model of team briefings for predicting frequency of
non-routine events in subsequent surgical procedures. Finally, the findings from this
study will contribute recommendations and guidance to the development of a formal
briefing protocol for the Division of Gynecological Surgery at the Methodist Hospital at
the Mayo Clinic.
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CHAPTER 2
METHODS
Participants and Study Site Information
This research involved observations and interviews with surgical teams in the
Division of Gynecological Surgery at Methodist Hospital at the Mayo Clinic in
Rochester, MN. Participants were members of the surgical teams, which included the
following roles: surgeon, resident, anesthesiologist, certified registered nurse anesthetist
(CRNA), circulating nurse (RN), certified surgical assistant (CSA), and certified surgical
technologist (CST). In this division, the anesthesiologists are responsible for overseeing 1
- 4 operating rooms at a time, so they were in the room intermittently to check in with the
CRNA who was referred to as the “in-room provider” for the anesthesia team. The
observed surgical procedures included minimally invasive laparoscopic surgeries, general
open surgeries, and robotic surgical procedures.
In this division, a team briefing for each operating room (OR) is conducted in the
morning prior to all surgical cases. This team briefing reviews all of the surgical cases
that will take place in that specific OR for that day. For this study, a surgical case was
defined as the surgical procedures for an individual patient. Thus, surgical teams typically
completed between 1 and 3 cases per day. In this division team members often varied
between cases and within cases (due to handoffs, shift changes, etc.), so different teams
and team members were observed throughout the data collection period. It should be
noted that briefings are not currently implemented across all departments or divisions at
this institution, however this division has been conducting team briefings for
approximately 2 years. Although there are mandated start times for when the team
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briefing should occur, there is no formal protocol for instructing teams how to
appropriately conduct the briefings.
Initially, data for this research was collected as part of a larger Quality
Improvement project studying teamwork in the operating room. Prior to collecting any
data, the principal investigator and research team met with the larger department for each
role on the surgical team (e.g. Nursing, Anesthesiology, etc.) during their morning
meetings. At these meetings, a presentation was given about the research objectives and
plans for data collection. The meetings gave surgical team members an opportunity to
raise questions and concerns and helped to build a rapport with the research team.
Building a positive relationship with and gaining acceptance from the surgical teams was
an essential component for efficiently accomplishing this type of research (Blocker,
2012; Neuman, 2000).
The observational data were collected over a period of 5 months, which yielded
data for 24 briefings and 45 surgical cases. As part of a Quality Improvement project
there was no requirement to obtain informed consent for observations from surgical team
members and as this is a teaching facility, patients consent to participating in research
and educational endeavors upon enrollment. However, surgical team members were
informed when observations would take place and were given the opportunity to opt out
of any portion of the study. There was one instance where a surgeon asked that their case
not be video-recorded and one instance where a CSA chose not to participate in
completing the surveys; the researcher complied with both requests. When the
observational data collection was complete for the Quality Improvement project, the
researcher coded the briefing videos and subsequent surgical case videos making sure to
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not include any personally identifiable information for either the surgical team members
or the patient. Retrospective review of the de-identified and coded data for analysis in the
current study was approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB).
The cognitive interviews were conducted separately from the observations and
were collected over a one week period. The IRB approved this study as exempt and
agreed to waive informed consent. There was no personally identifiable information
collected during the interviews. Participant data was coded only according to their role on
the surgical team. Although participation in this portion of the study was voluntary, the
participants were compensated with meal tickets for their time.
Materials and Apparatus
Cognitive Task Analysis Interview. Questions for the interview portion of this study
were adapted from the Applied Cognitive Task Analysis (ACTA) methodology
(Millitello & Hutton, 1998). ACTA was chosen as a framework for the interviews for its
ability to elicit important cognitive strategies used to accomplish tasks and describe the
cognitive knowledge necessary for judgments and decision making (Millitello & Hutton,
1998). As the purpose of the interviews was to understand informational needs from the
different roles on the surgical team, questions for the interview were semi-structured to
prompt participants to share opinions and experiences openly (Millitello & Hutton,
1998).
Video-recording. A Hero3 Black Edition GoPro camera (Figure 1) was used to record all
observational data. The researcher would hold the camera to record the morning team
briefings, which occurred either outside of the operating room in the hallway or inside the
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operating room, prior to the start of the surgical procedure. To record the surgical cases,
the camera was mounted to an IV pole that was reserved for research use and positioned
towards the foot of the patient bed, outside of the sterile environment. Video recording
for the surgical cases began when the patient arrived in the operating room and ceased
when the patient left the room.
Figure 1. Hero3 Black Edition GoPro Camera used for observational data collection.
Data Collection Tool. To record the occurrence of non-routine events, a tablet PC-tool
(see Appendix H) was used that has been developed and validated for the prospective
collection of non-routine events in healthcare environments (Blocker et al., 2010). The
data-collection tool allows for the real-time collection of multiple NRE data points
including when the disruption occurs, how long the disruption lasts, what is the type of
disruption (Table 1), a brief description of the disruption, how severe the disruption is to
the surgical flow (Table 2), and which roles on the surgical team are impacted by the
disruption.
The data collection tablet tool was initially developed using the Systems
Engineering Initiative for Patient Safety (SEIPS) framework (Blocker et al., 2010;
Blocker, 2012; Carayon, Hundt, Karsh, & Gurses, 2006). The SEIPS approach has been
used in several studies to successfully identify a relationship between NRE’s and errors
that could potentially affect patient safety and team outcomes (Blocker, 2012;
Wiegmann, 2007). Therefore, utilizing the data collection tool, derived from the SEIPS
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framework, is an appropriate approach for this research. Whereas the data collection table
tool was originally designed for observing cardiac surgical cases (Blocker et al., 2010), it
has since been generalized and found to also be a valid tool for use in other healthcare
domains including trauma (Blocker et al., 2012; Blocker, Shouhed, Gangi, & Ley et al.,
2013; Catchpole, Gangi, Blocker, & Ley et al., 2013).
Table 1. Non-Routine Event Categories with Definitions and Examples (Blocker, et al. 2010;
Blocker 2012; Blocker et al., 2013; Hendrickson, et al. 2010)
NRE Type Definition Example
Teamwork Any breach or lapse in team communication,
coordination, cooperativeness, and/or
familiarity negatively affecting surgical flow.
“Surgeon had to repeat his
request to the RN three times.”
Equipment Equipment problems hindering the smooth
progression of the surgical team’s procedure.
“Monitor was malfunctioning
during laparoscopic procedure.”
External
Interruptions
Disruptions imposed on the procedure from
outside, which include extraneous people,
phone calls, or intercom messages that did
not directly relate to the procedure at hand.
“RN receives phone call for
surgeon with updates from
surgery in second OR.”
Environment Disruptions affecting the auditory or visual
status of the operating room and not directly
relevant to the treatment of the patient.
“Anesthesiologist tripped over
cord near the bed.”
Technical
factors
Skill-based or decision (thinking) error,
including poorly executed tasks, omitted
steps, or misinterpretation of relevant
information.
“CSA did not know how to
correctly operate the harmonic
device.”
Training Training or supervision that hinders the
natural progression of the surgical procedure.
“Resident had difficulty
locating the ureter and needed
guidance from surgeon.”
Patient
factors
Patient-specific issues resulting in
disruptions to the natural progression of the
surgical procedure.
“Patient’s blood pressure (BP)
spikes in trundellemburg
position and the bed must be
returned to normal position until
BP becomes regular.”
Other Any disruption not falling into one of the
above categories.
“A specimen got on the CSA’s
shoe and the RN removed it.”
For this research, there were two observers who independently collected NRE
data during the prospective observations. The observers consisted of a post-doctoral
researcher and a graduate student researcher both of whom had backgrounds in human
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factors. Prior to starting data collection, there was a training period where both observers
would watch the same surgical cases and code NRE’s independently. Through this
training, the researchers were able to establish high inter-rater reliability (90%) levels that
were consistent with other research (Blocker et al., 2010; Blocker, 2012).
Table 2. Non-routine Event Severity Classification (Blocker et al., 2010; Blocker, 2012;
Henrickson et al., 2010)
Severity Definition
No impact No acknowledgement of the disruption.
Acknowledge/No Delay A surgical team member is aware of the disruption, but there is no
pause in the flow of the operation.
Momentary Delay Brief pause in surgical flow of the operation for <1 minute as a
result of the disruption.
Moderate Delay Significant pause in the surgical flow of the operation for <1 minute
as a result of the disruption.
Full Case Cessation One or more surgical team members must pause their current task
and engage in a secondary activity that impeded the progress of the
original task and significantly disrupts surgical flow of the operation.
Surveys. Surgical team members were asked to complete surveys (Appendix I)
immediately following the morning briefing and at the end of each surgical case for that
day. The purpose of the surveys was to capture team members’ perceptions of the
information discussed in the morning briefing and its relevance to the subsequent surgical
procedures. The surveys also collected demographic information and ratings of how
difficulty for the previous surgical procedures.
Procedures
Interviews. The researcher aimed to conduct cognitive interviews with 1-2 participants
for each role on the surgical team (e.g. surgeon, resident, anesthesiologist, CRNA, RN,
CST, and CSA). The researcher worked with the nurse managers for the OR to schedule
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the interviews with members of the surgical teams. Once a participant was scheduled, the
researcher would meet with the participant in an empty OR to conduct the interview. The
empty OR was important in providing context for the participant’s responses. The
interviews typically lasted 20 minutes. The interviews were kept short intentionally as
time was valuable for the surgical team members and they were often participating on
their break or prior to the start of their shift. The researcher would begin by describing in
general the objectives of the research and reminding the participant that no individually
identifiable information was being collected. Next, the researcher would begin the
interview, asking the semi-structured questions in the same general format for each
participant. The researcher made sure to appropriately query the participant further for
“situation assessment actions, critical cues, and potential errors” (Millitello & Hutton,
1998) in regards to what, how, and whether specific information should be provided in a
team briefing. The researcher took notes during the interview, which were later
transcribed for analysis.
Observations. The researcher worked with the nurse managers to schedule days for
observations. On observation days, researchers would arrive to the OR in the morning in
time to video record the team briefing using the GoPro camera. At the team briefing, the
researcher would introduce themselves and remind the surgical team of the research
objectives. When the team briefing began, the researcher would hold the camera and
video record the entirety of the team briefing. Following the team briefing, all surgical
team members assigned to the OR being observed were asked to complete the “After
Briefing” portion of the survey. This portion of the survey recorded demographic
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information, assessed perceptions of the team briefing content quality, and obtained
ratings of what information provided at the briefing was most memorable.
Next, the researcher would set up the camera for to record the surgical cases by
attaching the GoPro to a mount on an IV pole that was reserved for research use. The IV
pole was always positioned towards the foot of the patient bed, outside of the sterile
environment. The researcher would begin video recording for the surgical cases when the
patient arrived in the operating room and ceased video recording when the patient left the
room. After each surgical case, the same team members who were present at the morning
team briefing were asked to complete the “After Surgery” portions of the survey. These
portions of the survey assessed how well the actual surgery matched the team member’s
expectations of how the surgery would proceed based on the morning briefing content.
Ratings of surgical difficulty were also obtained. The researcher always made sure to ask
the surgical team members to complete the survey when they had free time so as not to
disrupt their work flow in either cleaning up from the previous surgical case or preparing
for the next surgical case.
During the observations, once the patient was in the room and draped, the
researchers collected non-routine event data using the validated data collection PC-tablet
tool (Blocker et al., 2010; Blocker, 2012). The researcher would categorize the NREs in
real time according to the type of disruption, impact of the disruption on the surgical
team, the duration of the disruption, and a free-text description of the event. Each entry
was time-stamped automatically by the data collection software. As stated above, prior to
data collection, all researchers trained to properly identify and categorize NRE
disruptions and had a high (90%) inter-rater reliability. At least one researcher was
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present for the entirety of the team briefing and each subsequent surgical case. The data
collection tool automatically transferred all data points into a spreadsheet for analysis.
As previously mentioned, data were collected intermittently over a period of 5
months, yielding data for 24 briefings and 45 surgical cases. Video-recordings of the
team briefings and surgical procedures were downloaded at the end of each data
collection day to a password protected hard drive. Within seven days of each data
collection day, the video recording of the team briefing and surgical procedures were
coded into de-identified data sets and then the videos were deleted.
Finally, during observations and video recording, the researcher always took great
care to not compromise the surgical procedures being performed. Study participants were
notified that video recording, observations, and surveys may be delayed or skipped by
giving a short verbal notice to the research team if any of these processes interfered with
or jeopardized the surgical procedure being performed.
Data Analysis
Overview of Data Analysis Strategy. This study employed the use of both qualitative and
quantitative methods at different points in the data analysis. For the cognitive task
analysis interviews, qualitative coding techniques were employed to understand key
themes in the data. Descriptive statistics were used to analyze the characteristics of the
team briefings (Aim #1) and the non-routine events (Aim #2) for gynecological surgery.
To assess the relationship between team briefing characteristics and non-routine events
(Aim #3), Pearson’s correlations and independent samples t tests were conducted.
Finally, principle component regression analysis was used to build a model of team
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briefings in gynecological surgery that could describe and potentially predict the nature
of the relationship between team briefing characteristics and non-routine events.
The following sections describe in more detail the qualitative methods used to
analyze the cognitive task analysis interviews, the technique used to generate networks
for describing and analyzing team briefing communication (Aim #1), and the steps
followed to complete the principle component regression analysis (Aim #4).
Coding of Cognitive Task Analysis Interviews. The transcribed notes from all interviews
were independently reviewed by two human factors researchers who have experience in
the operating room and had previously observed multiple team briefings for
gynecological surgery. As the primary goal for conducting the interviews was to
understand the cognitive knowledge needs and informational requirements at both the
team and individual team member level, two coding strategies were employed to further
analyze the transcribed interview data.
Descriptive coding (Saldana, 2013) was first used to identify the broader team
briefing content topics that are important across all team members. To accomplish this,
descriptive coding assigns nouns or phrases to describe the basic topic of a short passage
of data which in this situation as the responses to the interview questions. Descriptive
coding is a useful first step to “categorize data at a basic level, providing the researcher
with an organizational grasp of the study” (Saldana, 2013, p. 91). Next, another round of
descriptive coding was conducted to identify the team briefing topics that are important
across the individual team roles.
To more specifically understand the critical steps involved in a good team
briefing, process coding (Saldana et al., 2013) was employed for its ability to identify
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routine and strategic human processes in observable activities (Corbin & Strauss, 2008;
Saldana, 2013). In process coding, gerunds (“ing” words) and verbs are used to code the
data (Saldana, 2013).
For both strategies, the researchers would first coded independently, then jointly
reviewed the data, combining and dividing coded topics as needed until a consensus was
met. Frequency of coded items was recorded, which allowed the data to be organized into
three general topic areas that will be further discussed in the results section.
Team Briefing Communication Networks. From each team briefing video, the researcher
was able identify communication flow by coding instances of communication between
surgical team members. For each communication instance, the researcher noted who
talked to whom. This data were then submitted to Node XL, an open-source, network
analysis and visualization software add-on package for Microsoft Excel. Within Node
XL, the researcher was able to create directed networks for each team briefing event and
calculate various metrics for each network.
For this research, graph density was used as the metric of analysis for team
briefing communication. Graph density is “the ratio that compares the number of edges in
the graph with the maximum number of edges the graph would have if all the vertices
were connected to each other” (NodeXL, Microsoft Excel). The literature largely
concludes that there is a positive relationship between the quantity of communication and
improved team-related outcomes (Bowers et al., 1998; Cooke et al., 2005; Cooke, et al.,
2008). Therefore, in this research, it was assumed that greater density is representative of
better communication and a lower density is representative of poorer communication.
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Aside from creating networks to visualize the communication from each
individual team briefing, the data were also averaged across all briefings to create
networks representing the average communication among teams during all briefings, and
briefings led by either surgeons or residents. In all networks, each node (or vertex)
represents a role on the surgical team (e.g. surgeon, anesthesiologist, resident, CRNA,
RN, CSA, CST). The size of the node indicates the frequency with which that role on the
surgical team communicates (e.g. larger node = more communication) in general. A link
between each node suggests there is, on average, at least one instance of communication
between the two nodes (e.g. roles) for that briefing. The weight (e.g. thickness) of the link
between two nodes indicates the frequency with which one role communicates with
another role (e.g. thicker link = more communication).
Principle Components Regression Analysis. As previously stated, the primary goal of
Aim #4 in this research study was to develop a model for team briefings in gynecological
surgery. The secondary goal was to determine if the model was predictive of the
dependent variable, which in this research was the frequency of non-routine events.
The non-routine event data provided several data points that had the potential to serve as
a dependent variable for the model, including frequency, duration, and severity.
However, NRE frequency was chosen as the final dependent variable in this study
because the literature has reliably found a relationship between the amount of NRE’s that
occur and surgical errors (Wiegmann et al., 2007). Severity and duration of non-routine
events have yet to be linked to team outcomes.
Principle components regression was the method chosen to develop the model due
to expectations of high multicollinearity among the predictor variables used to build the
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model. Multicollinearity occurs when two or more predictor variables are highly
correlated with each other (Kachigan, 1991). Table 3 lists the dependent variable and the
specific predictor variables, whose values were identified in Aim #1 and Aim #2 of the
data analysis, that were used in developing the model of team briefings.
Table 3. Predictor and Dependent Variables Used to Develop Team Briefing Model
Predictor Variables SPSS Code
Duration of briefing Briefing time
Duration of each case discussion at briefing Briefing case time
Number of cases briefed Number cases briefed
Time between briefing and case (e.g. position) Case position
Team members present at briefing Surgeon, ANT, CRNA,
resident, RN, CSA, CST
Number of extra people present (e.g. RN manager) Extra people
Percent of team present at briefing Team present at briefing
Percent of same team present at each case Team present at case
Team member leading briefing Leader
Tool used to lead briefing (e.g. SHA, memory) Tool
Location of briefing (e.g. OR or hallway) Location
Number of questions asked Questions
Communication network density Communication density
Introductions Intros
Number of items discussed at briefing Items
Number of items discussed per case at briefing Items per case
Number of interruptions Interruptions
Average years of experience of team members Team experience
Average degree of case difficulty Team difficulty
Average degree to which case matched
expectations set forth by briefing
Team expectations
Multiple surgeons in one briefing Multiple surgeons
Dependent Variable
Frequency of non-routine events NRE Frequency
The selection of predictor variables was derived based on findings in the literature,
common themes identified in the cognitive task analysis interviews, or because they were
constructs that were highly variable from briefing to briefing during preliminary
observations. Further, as this research study is one of the first to develop a model for
team briefings, the strategy was to utilize all available and observable data points
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possible. However, the use of all data points possible resulted in a high probability that
multicollinearity would occur. For example, briefing time and number of items briefed
were highly correlated, which is not surprising given that the longer a briefing lasts
suggests that people are talking longer and accordingly, covering more “items”.
Thus, principle component regression was employed for its capacity to reduce
multicollinearity among the data (Liu, Kuang, Gong, & Hou, 2003). Essentially, Liu et al.
(2003) claim that the principal component regression is
“a method of combing linear regression with principle component analysis such
that it can gather highly correlated independent variables into a principal
component, and all principal components are independent of each other, and so in
effect, a set of correlated variables have been transformed into a set of
uncorrelated principle components. (p.142)”
Therefore, the use of principle components regression is appropriate as it alleviates the
problem of multicollinearity by combining the statistical methods of regression and factor
analysis to convert correlated variables into uncorrelated components that can then be
transformed back into a general linear regression equation (Liu et al., 2003).
For this research, the six step tutorial outlined by Liu et al. (2003) for completing
principle component regression in SPSS was employed. The steps are described in further
detail below:
1. Conduct a stepwise regression using the dependent and all independent variables
to determine which independent variables are statistically significant (p<.05) and
to reveal whether the independent variables have multicollinearity or not.
Multicollinearity was evident when independent variables displayed low tolerance
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and high VIF as well as eigenvalues close to zero. The “best” model from this
analysis will be chosen based on how close its adjusted R2 value is to 1 as this a
measure of goodness of fit for linear models (Liu et al., 2003).
2. Use the statistically significant independent variables to conduct a principal
component analysis to transform the independent variables to a set of uncorrelated
principle components. This calculation will also reveal the cumulative variance
proportion of the different principle components.
3. Calculate the standardized dependent and independent variables. Use the
standardized variables to compute the standardized versions of the principle
components.
4. Using the standardized principle components, conduct the principle component
regression analysis. This involves starting with the first principal component, then
adding each additional principal component backwards, one by one, until all
possible standardized principle component regression equations are calculated.
5. Transform the “best” standardized principle component regression equation into a
standardized linear regression equation. Again, the “best” model will be chosen
based on how close its adjusted R2 value is to 1 (Liu et al., 2003).
6. Compute the partial regression coefficients and constant to finally transform the
standardized linear regression equation into the general linear regression equation.
In this study, the researcher followed the six steps outlined above to satisfy the
primary goal of developing a model for team briefings. As mentioned previously, the
observational data collection yielded data for 45 surgical cases. Thus, to satisfy the
secondary goal of testing the predictive capacity of the model, only data from 40 surgical
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cases was used to develop the model while 5 cases were randomly chosen to be reserved
for predictive testing. Once the model was complete, the data from the reserved 5 cases
was submitted to the model to determine whether it could predict the actual value (e.g.
frequency) of the non-routine events that occurred in the surgical case. Measures of error
between the predicted values and the actual values were calculated to assess the
predictive capability of the model.
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CHAPTER 3
RESULTS
The results from the four aims of this study are presented below. First, the
findings from the individual interviews with surgical team members are presented. Next,
the characteristics of team briefings as identified from the video-recordings are shown,
followed by the characteristics of the non-routine events, which were recorded during
observations of the surgical procedures. Finally, the model of team briefings, developed
using principle component regression analysis, will be revealed.
Cognitive Task Analysis Interviews
Interviews were conducted with 13 team members including 3 surgeons, 1 resident, 1
anesthesiologist, 2 CRNAs, 2 RNs, 2 CSTs, and 2 CSAs. Initial analysis revealed that all
team members indicated that it was important for the surgeon to be present for and
leading the briefing and that the duration needs to be as “brief” as possible. The
preference for a short briefing was not because team members felt it would be more
efficient, but rather they have other more important tasks to get to. Interestingly, all team
members indicated that the best time for the briefing was in the morning prior to all
surgical cases, except for 1 surgeon, 1 RN, and 1 CST who indicated that a briefing
before each surgical case would be more helpful and more efficient. These team members
recognized that team members change throughout the day as does information about an
upcoming surgery and having a briefing closer to the time that surgery occurs would be
effective.
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The data coded from the interviews were organized into three topic areas to better
understand the knowledge and information that these team members acknowledged as
most important for briefings in gynecological surgery. Table 4 shows the top ten most
frequently identified “purposes” for holding the team briefings. The findings in this table
represent all roles on the surgical team.
Table 4. Top ten reasons for the purpose of a team briefing in gynecological surgery.
Purpose of a briefing
1. Get on the “same page”
2. Promote team communication
3. Coordinate team tasks
4. Clarify information and ask questions
5. Review patient information
6. Discuss surgeon preferences
7. Discuss expectations and risks
8. Facilitate teamwork
9. Review special needs
10. Introductions
During the interviews team members were asked to break down the common steps
of a briefing to identify the most critical components. Team members consistently
identified the same 6-8 factors, shown here in Table 5. These factors had significant
overlap with the items from Table 4 but tended to be more specific to individual surgical
procedures. For example, identifiers and co-morbidities of specific patients were
recognized as vital steps to cover during the briefing.
Table 5. Eight critical steps for conducting a team briefing in gynecological surgery.
Critical steps of a briefing
1. Conducting introductions
2. Providing patient identifiers
3. Discussing co-morbidities
4. Providing the surgical plan
5. Discussing anticipations/expectations
6. Discussing surgeon preferences
7. Identifying special needs
8. Asking questions/discussing concerns
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Overall, the interviews found that across team members, there were similar opinions
on the purpose of a team briefing and the critical steps involved in conducting a team
briefing was consistent across all teams roles. However, when the data were analyzed
across individual team roles, there were different topics that emerged as critical content
for team briefings including chance of proceeding, patient characteristics, and
medications. Table 6 shows the three most frequently discussed topics by role on the
surgical team throughout the interviews.
Table 6. Critical briefing content by team role for gynecological surgery.
Content ANT CSA CST RN RES
Chance of proceeding  
Patient information  
Surgeon preference    
Anticipations/Expectations 
Special needs   
Patient Characteristics 
Medications  
Medications were discussed as important information to cover at the briefing by
the anesthesiologist and CRNAs, which is not surprising since they administer the
medication, and the RNs who must chart the medications being administered. Patient
characteristics refer to the personality or emotional state of the patient prior to surgery.
Members of the anesthesia team commented that this was critical information to know, as
they are the ones who interact with the patient and have to keep them calm prior to
administering anesthetics. For example, it was mentioned that it’s helpful to know if the
patient is unusually upset so that the anesthesia care provider can prepare for how to
handle the patient. In gynecological surgery, there are often many ways that the surgery
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may proceed once the surgical team has gone in and evaluated the patient. Thus, “chance
of proceeding” refers to the fact that the surgical plan may be to start a procedure
laparoscopically however, there may be a 50% chance that once they begin the procedure
they will see signs of cancer and if so, the surgical plan may then change to an open
surgery. Accordingly, it’s important to specific team members (e.g. the CST) to know
possible directions the case may go so that appropriate equipment can be pulled from the
core and be prepared for potential use.
Characteristics of Team Briefings
There were 24 observed briefings that originally briefed on 49 surgical cases.
There was not a day that a researcher observed when a briefing did not occur. Despite
there originally being 49 surgical cases that were briefed on, there were only 45 surgical
cases that were able to be observed; 3 cases were cancelled or moved to a different OR,
and 1 case was requested by the surgeon to be excused from observation.
The briefings that were observed were typically held in the hallway (79%) and
less often were held in the operating room (21%). On average, it was noted that for each
briefing there was an average of 5 interruptions (SD = 3.19, range: 0 – 9, Mdn = 5).
Some examples of interruptions included people walking through the briefing, team
members leaving to answer phones or pagers, team members arriving late to the briefing,
or team members leaving abruptly half way through the briefing.
The duration of team briefings was calculated by subtracting the briefing end time
from the start time. It was observed that briefings lasted an average of 3 minutes and 38
seconds (SD = 0:01:19, range: 0:01:56 – 0:06:31, Mdn = 0:03:38). The observed team
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briefings typically covered information for either one (12.5%), two (70.8%), or three
(16.7%) individual cases depending on the operating room schedule for that day. Per each
briefing, mean discussion time for individual cases was 1 minute and 42 seconds (SD =
0:00:37, range: 0:01:00 – 0:03:56, Mdn = 0:01:25).
On average 83% of the whole surgical team was typically present for the briefing.
Attendance by individual team role including the surgeon (92%), CRNA (83%), resident
(83%), RN (100%), CSA (88%), CST (96%) was good with the anesthesiologist (42%)
being the only role that attended the briefing less than half the time. Aside from the main
surgical team, there was often an average of 3 extra people present at the team briefing
(SD = 1.66, range: 0 – 6, Mdn = 3). These “extra people” often included core personnel,
nurse managers, additional residents or CRNAs, or visiting students to name a few.
The briefings were most frequently led by the surgeons (75%) with the only other
role to lead the briefings being the residents (25%). Even though the residents led 6 of the
24 observed briefings, the surgeons were still present and participated in the briefing for
4 of those cases. There were also instances (25%) when the briefing was led by 2
different surgeons who would be overseeing separate cases consecutively in the same
operating room. These are unique briefings as the surgeon and resident will change from
one case to the next however the rest of the surgical team will remain the same.
Briefing leaders, regardless of role, relied on either the SHA (75%) or their memory
(25%) to support the information they were providing at the briefing. The SHA is a
specific document used in the OR at the Mayo Clinic. Essentially, the SHA is a print out
for each OR containing the scheduled cases for that day and case-specific information
such as the patient name, ID number, age, indication (e.g. why they are doing the
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procedure), procedure name, special equipment, and notes on the anesthesia protocol for
that procedure.
Interestingly, introductions only occurred at 25% of briefings. When they did
occur, it was typically the surgeon that would initiate the introductions. Introductions
were always informal with each team member presenting themselves by their first name
and role for the day (e.g. “Hi, I’m Bob and I’m the surgeon”, or “I’m Mary and I’ll be the
nurse in the room”). It should be noted however that of the instances where introductions
did occur, half of these occurrences began with the surgeon introducing the team to the
researcher and reminding the team of objectives for this research. This suggests that the
mere presence of the observers may have affected some aspects of team behavior.
The surveys revealed that on average the team experience for those observed at
the briefings was 12.37 years (SD = 11.51; range: 6 months – 37 years, Mdn = 13.25).  It
should be noted however the surgeons, residents, and anesthesiologists often did not
complete the surveys due to lack of time, so their data is largely absent from the team
experience results.
The communication for all team briefings was analyzed using NodeXL. Twenty-
four networks were developed, one for each briefing, revealing a mean communication
density of 0.46 (SD = 0.18, range: 0.21 – 1.00, Mdn = .43). Figure 2 depicts a directed
network for the overall communication averaged across all 24 observed briefings. This
network has a communication density of 0.38 and reveals that only the surgeon talked to
every other role at least once on average across the 24 observed briefings. On average,
the resident spoke to every other role except for the anesthesiologist at least once per
briefing. While the RN, CRNA, CST, and CSA would talk to the surgeon at least one per
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briefing on average, the anesthesiologist did not communicate with any other role at least
one time per briefing. Thus, the structure of the network overall suggests a hierarchical
nature to the team briefing communication on average, with whomever leads the briefing
(e.g. surgeon or resident) dictating most of the communication to the other roles on the
team.
Figure 2. Average overall communication network for briefings.
When comparing the communication networks for the individual briefings with
the greatest density and the least density, there were clear differences in communication
structure. Figure 3 depicts a directed network for the briefing with the greatest
communication density (graph density = 1.00). Here, even though the resident led the
briefing, the surgeon still spoke the most frequently, as indicated by the size of the
surgeon node, and each team member talked to every other team member at least once;
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except for the anesthesiologist, who was not present at the briefing. Figure 4 depicts a
directed network for the briefing with the least density (graph density = 0.21). Here, the
surgeon led the briefing and clearly dominated the communication. Whereas the resident,
anesthesiologist, and RN did communicate back with the surgeon at least once, no team
members communicated with one another during the briefing.
Figure 3. Network with the greatest communication density (1.00).
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Figure 4. Network with the smallest communication density (0.21).
As the network with the greatest density resulted from a resident-led briefing, the
researcher was interested in comparing the differences in the networks of average
resident-led briefing communication and average surgeon-led briefing communication.
Figure 5 depicts the directed network of average communication across the 6 resident led
team briefings (graph density = 0.50). Whereas the surgeon spoke more frequently than
the resident, all team members communicated back with the resident at least once on
average when they led the briefing. Further, there was communication among all team
members on average, except for the anesthesiologist. Figure 6 depicts the directed
network of average communication across the 18 surgeon-led team briefings (graph
density = 0.21). In this network, the surgeon appears to again be dominating the
conversation, with only the CRNA, RN, and CST communicating back at least once on
average across all 18 briefings. Further, there is no communication among any of the
team members.
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Figure 5. Network of average communication during briefings led by residents (density = 0.50)
Figure 6. Network of average communication during briefings led by surgeons (density = 0.21).
Additional analysis of the communication revealed that the mean number of
questions asked to be approximately 7 (SD = 4.08, range: 1 – 17, Mdn = 6) per briefing.
On average 27.53 items (SD = 7.57, range: 18 – 46, Mdn = 27) were discussed at the
team briefings. Per case, mean items discussed was 13.20 (SD = 4.91, range: 9 – 38, Mdn
= 11.50).  Important item categories were identified from the cognitive task analysis
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interviews. Some examples of item categories include patient identifiers, co-morbidities,
and steps of the surgical plan, special equipment needed, surgeon preferences, or
medications.
Characteristics of Non-Routine Events (NREs)
Across the observed gynecological surgical cases, there was an average of 12.51
non-routines events per case (SD = 13.41, range: 2 – 57, Mdn = 6). The majority of non-
routine events were either external interruptions (40%), teamwork related (26%), or
equipment related (21%). Technical skills (4%) and training related (5%)  non-routine
events were the next most prevalent types of disruption and environment (1%) and other
(<1%) non-routine events occurred least frequently (Figure 7). To better understand the
majority of non-routine events that occurred, the researcher analyzed those disruption
types to see what the specific non-routine events categories were.
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External interruption non-routine events mostly included pagers and phones
(51%) and external visitors coming in to the operating room (39%). The specific
teamwork related non-routine events included providing updates to the surgeon about
progress in their second operating room (26%), miscommunication among team members
(17%), and handoffs (36%) between team members for breaks or shift changes.
Equipment related non-routine events included instances when a piece of equipment was
needed and was not working (40%), was needed and was not present in the operating
room (32%), or was needed and was in the room, but was not ready to be used (23%).
Table 7 provides examples from the specific categories in which the majority of non-
routines events occurred.
Table 7. Examples of specific non-routine events captured by observers
Disruption
Type
Specific Category Example
External
Interruption
Pagers and phones “RN had to answer the phone in the middle of the
count and asked CST to wait for them to finish”
External visitors “Another CST comes in to talk with the CST in the
room”
Teamwork Providing updates to the
surgeon
“The team is waiting for the surgeon to come back
from second OR and check on port placement”
Miscommunication “RN asks CRNA to re-call the next case because no
one did it the first time she asked”
Handoffs “CRNA returns from a lunch break”
Equipment Not ready “Cautery tools were not plugged in, pedal was not at
surgeon’s foot”
Not working “Suction canister is leaking”
Not present/missing “RN had to go to the core for a vag pack that should
have already been out for surgeon to use”
On average, a non-routine event would last 1 minute and 22 seconds (SD =
0:02:46, range: 0:00:01 – 0:34:26, Mdn = 0:00:40). A brief non-routine event was usually
due to an external interruption such as answering a phone call or pager. The longest
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observed non-routine event lasted 0:34:26 and was teamwork related. Specifically, in this
case, the team experienced a full case cessation while waiting on pathology results which
were not sent to the lab at the appropriate time due to miscommunication between the
surgeon and the RN
Analysis of the non-routine events (Figure 8) revealed that the RN (43.16%) was
involved the majority of the time. The entire surgical team (13.68%) was the second most
prevalent “role” involved in non-routine events. The surgeon (10.12%), resident
(10.12%), and anesthesia team, including both the anesthesiologist and the CRNA
(10.48%), experienced similar amounts of non-routine events. The CSA (4.2%) and CST
(8.17%) were the members least frequently involved in non-routine events.
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Figure 8. Team members involved in non-routine events.
The results (Figure 9) revealed that the impact of non-routine events observed in
the gynecological surgeries ranged from No Impact (2.13%) to Full Case Cessation
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(4.26%). The majority of non-routine events were identified as Momentary Delay
(62.34%) or Acknowledge/No Delay (18.83%), with a small but significant percentage of
the non-routine events deemed Moderate Delay (8.17%). The non-routine events
identified as Momentary Delay were most often instances of external interruptions such
as answering pagers/phones or dealing with an external visitor.
Figure 9. Non-routine events by level of severity
In Figure 10 the severity levels are analyzed according to the most common types
of non-routine events illustrating that external interruptions are the most frequent non-
routine events, which cause a momentary delay. Interestingly, non-routine events related
to teamwork and equipment tends to be more severe in impact than external interruptions.
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Figure 10. Severity level for most common types of non-routine events
Relationship between Characteristics of Team Briefings and NREs
To understand the relationship between non-routine events (NREs) and briefing
characteristics, correlations were calculated for quantitative variables and t tests were
conducted for qualitative variables. Specifically, Pearson product-moment correlation
coefficients (r) were computed to assess the relationship between the frequency of NREs,
the duration of NREs, the severity of NREs, and quantitative team briefing characteristics
(Table 8).
There were significant correlations between the number of interruptions during a
briefing and NRE frequency (r = .336, p<.05), the percent of the team present at the
briefing and NRE severity (r = .377, p < .05), the number of extra people present at the
briefing and NRE frequency (r= -.476, p<.05), the number of extra people present at the
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briefing and NRE severity (r= -.364, p<.05), and the number of items discussed and NRE
severity (r = -.470, p<.05).
Though not significantly correlated, there were other interesting relationships
revealed through this analysis including a negative correlation between the position of a
case and NRE frequency indicating that surgical cases first thing in the morning are
associated with higher NREs than cases later in the day. A negative correlation was also
revealed between communication density and NRE frequency suggesting that less
communication during the briefing is associated with more NREs in the subsequent
surgical case. Despite communication density being negatively correlated, there was a
positive correlation between the number of questions asked and NRE frequency. Finally,
there was a negative correlation between the average team experience for each case and
the frequency, severity, and duration of NREs on subsequent surgical cases.
Table 8. Correlations between NREs and Briefing Characteristics
Predictor Variable NREFrequency
NRE
Duration
NRE
Severity
Case position
-.089 .114 .076
Briefing time
-0.033 -0.043 -0.143
Briefing case time
-0.032 -0.043 -0.143
Communication density
-0.101 0.045 -0.027
Questions 0.206 0.018 -0.190
Interruptions
-.336* -0.224 0.138
Team present at briefing 0.051 0.194 .377*
Team present at case
-0.022 -0.067 -0.219
Extra people
-.476** -.364* 0.083
Items 0.130 -0.110 -.470**
Items per case 0.176 -0.001 -0.080
Team experience
-0.142 -0.043 -0.213
*p<.05
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Independent samples t tests were computed to assess the relationship between
frequency of NREs and qualitative briefing characteristics including whether
introductions were given, who led the briefing, what tool did the briefing leader rely on,
the location of the briefing, and whether there were multiple surgeons briefing in for the
same surgical team operating room and surgical team (Table 9). To ensure there
homogeneity of variance in all t tests, Welch’s correction was used when necessary.
There was a significant effect for introductions, t (14) = 2.60, p < .05, suggesting that
NREs are more frequent when introductions do not occur. There was a significant effect
for the briefing leader t (11) = 2.76, p<.05, suggesting that NREs are more frequent when
the surgeon leads the briefing as opposed to the resident. Finally, there was a significant
effect found for briefings involving multiple surgeons t (9) = -2.26, p<.05, implying that
when there are more surgeons briefing for the same operating room, there are more NREs
which occur in the subsequent surgical cases. There were no significant differences for
the location of the briefing or the tool used by the briefing leader.
Table 9. Results for Independent Samples t tests for Briefing Characteristic and NREs
Briefing
Characteristic Condition M SD t df P
Introductions
n= 14
No 22.14 18.13 2.60 26 0.02*Yes 8.43 7.75
Briefing leader
n= 11
Surgeon 14.36 11.41 2.76 20 0.03*Resident 6.09 3.89
Briefing tool
n= 12
SHA 16.17 16.24 0.97 17.60 0.34Memory 10.83 9.37
Location
n=8
Hallway 10.13 10.83
-1.25 11.37 0.24OR 19.5 18.28
Multiple Surgeon
n=9
No 6.44 4.19
-2.26 16 0.04*Yes 22.67 21.27
*<.05
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After each surgical case was complete, team members filled out the surveys and
rated the difficulty of the previous surgery. The Pearson product-moment correlation
coefficient was computed to assess the relationship between the frequencies of NREs, the
duration of NREs, the severity of NREs, and the average difficulty ratings of each
surgical case. There was a significant correlation between case difficulty and NRE
frequency (r = .534, p<.05). Though not significant, the correlation between NRE
duration, NRE severity and case difficulty was also positive.
After each surgical case, team members filled out the surveys and rated how well
the actual surgical case matched the expectations they had based on the team briefing.
The Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient was computed to assess the
relationship between the frequencies of NREs, the duration of NREs, the severity of
NREs, and the average team expectations for each surgical case. While none of the
correlations were significant, there was a negative correlation between team expectations
and all NRE measures suggesting that when the briefing was indicative of how the
surgical case was actually going to proceed, the frequency, duration and severity of NREs
were lower.
Model of Team Briefings for Gynecological Surgery.
Principle component regression analysis was used to develop a model of team
briefings using the frequency of non-routine events as the dependent variable and
selected predictor variables from 24 briefings and 40 surgical cases. The predictive
accuracy of the model was then tested using the data from five surgical cases that had
been randomly reserved.  Measurements of predictive accuracy were calculated by
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comparing the values predicted by the model to actual, observed values. The results from
this analysis are described below.
Using SPSS, a stepwise regression (backward) was conducted to determine which of
the original predictor variables (Table 3) were significant with regards to the dependent
variable of NRE frequency. Table 10 provides the model summary for the regression
analysis. Model 7 was selected as it had the highest adjusted R2 value (.836) (Liu et al.,
2003). Table 11 suggests that this model does in fact exhibit multicollinearity among the
predictor variables, as shown by the multiple low tolerance levels (< 0.2), high VIF
values (> 5), low eigenvalues (close to zero), and high condition indices (< 15). The
evidence of multicollinearity confirms the need for the principle components regression
analysis.
Table 10. Model Summary for Stepwise Regression with all Predictor Variables
Model R R Square AdjustedR Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
1 .957a .916 .796 6.269
2 .957b .916 .808 6.082
3 .957c .916 .818 5.921
4 .957d .915 .826 5.784
5 .956e .913 .831 5.699
6 .954f .910 .833 5.672
7 .953g .908 .836 5.611
8 .949h .900 .830 5.716
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Table 11. Model 7 Partial Regression Coefficient and Collinearity Statistics
Predictor
Variables bi t p
Collinearity Statistics
Tolerance VIF Eigenvalue ConditionIndex
(Constant) -5.152 .000 - - 13.081 1.000
Case position -.184 -2.559 .018 .807 1.239 1.253 3.321
Team experience -.393 -3.208 .004 .280 3.576 .926 3.758
Team difficulty .452 4.723 .000 .459 2.179 .781 4.094
Briefing time -.902 -5.900 .000 .179 5.572 .582 4.739
Num. cases briefed 1.344 7.017 .000 .114 8.741 .353 6.091
Comm. density .668 3.410 .003 .109 9.139 .285 6.770
Leader -.352 -1.367 .185 .063 15.802 .222 7.680
Tool -.736 -6.569 .000 .334 2.995 .134 9.888
Location .470 3.891 .001 .287 3.483 .104 11.191
Interruptions .983 5.404 .000 .127 7.895 .083 12.517
Surgeon .617 4.308 .000 .204 4.893 .072 13.504
ANT .332 2.508 .020 .239 4.188 .051 15.966
CRNA -.326 -3.298 .003 .429 2.330 .035 19.209
Resident .365 3.117 .005 .306 3.270 .021 25.020
CST -.404 -2.750 .012 .194 5.145 .011 34.604
Extra people -.450 -3.753 .001 .292 3.429 .004 57.068
Items per case 1.354 8.067 .000 .149 6.717 .001 102.765
There were 16 significant predictor variables (p<.05) in the selected model. These
variables were submitted to a principle component analysis to transform them into a set
of sixteen uncorrelated principle components. The results from this step of analysis
revealed that a large proportion of the cumulative variance is accounted for by the first 8
– 9 principle components (Table 12). The correlation coefficients produced from the
factor analysis were combined with the standardized predictor variables to compute
standardized principle component equations.
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Table 12. Eigenvalues and % of Variance for Each Principle Component
Component
(C)
Initial Eigenvalues
Total % of Variance Cumulative %
1 3.117 19.480 19.480
2 2.779 17.370 36.850
3 1.742 10.886 47.736
4 1.527 9.544 57.279
5 1.306 8.162 65.441
6 1.167 7.292 72.733
7 .905 5.657 78.390
8 .858 5.360 83.750
9 .679 4.244 87.994
10 .606 3.785 91.779
11 .402 2.511 94.290
12 .327 2.046 96.336
13 .250 1.561 97.897
14 .220 1.374 99.271
15 .072 .447 99.718
16 .045 .282 100.000
Next, using the standardized principle components equations a regression analysis
was run, starting with the first component (e.g. C1) and then adding another principle
component (e.g. C1, C2), until all possible standardized principle component regressions
were calculated. Table 13 provides the summary for the “best” model (e.g., the one with
the highest adjusted R2, of 0.830) chosen from this step in the analysis. Table 14
illustrates evidence that the multicollinearity has been removed from the overall model
with tolerance values, VIF values, eigenvalues, and condition indices all closer or equal
to 1.
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Table 13. Model Summary for the Best Model from Principle Component Regression
Model R RSquare
Adjusted R
Square
Std. Error of the
Estimate
C16 .949a .900 .830 .41203750
Table 14. Principle Component Regression Model Coefficients and Collinearity Statistics
Principle
components Bi t Sig.
Collinearity Statistics
Tolerance VIF Eigenvalues ConditionIndex
(Constant) .000 1.000
c1 -.422 -6.402 .000 1.000 1.000 1.036 1.000
c2 .224 3.391 .003 .999 1.001 1.016 1.009
c3 -.365 -5.536 .000 .999 1.001 1.008 1.014
c4 -.104 -1.581 .128 1.000 1.000 1.005 1.015
c5 .164 2.481 .021 1.000 1.000 1.003 1.016
c6 .000 .003 .998 1.000 1.000 1.002 1.017
c7 -.005 -.077 .939 1.000 1.000 1.002 1.017
c8 .184 2.787 .010 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.018
c9 .029 .438 .666 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.018
c10 -.094 -1.422 .168 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.018
c11 .241 3.653 .001 1.000 1.000 .998 1.019
c12 .019 .292 .773 1.000 1.000 .998 1.019
c13 .289 4.377 .000 1.000 1.000 .997 1.019
c14 .052 .782 .442 1.000 1.000 .995 1.020
c15 -.097 -1.473 .154 1.000 1.000 .991 1.022
c16 .548 8.309 .000 .999 1.001 .980 1.028
The principle components that were significant (p < .05) from the chosen model
were selected to compute the “best” standardized principle component regression (1):
y’ = -.422C1 + .224 C2 - .365C3 + .164C5 + .184C8 + .241C11 + .289C13 + .548C16
The individual standardized principle component equations were substituted into this
model to generate a standardized linear regression equation. Then, in the final step, the
final coefficients and constant were calculated to create the general linear regression
(1)
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equation, which represents the model for predicting NRE frequency based on attributes of
team briefings in gynecological surgery. The general linear regression equation (2) and
the general linear regression equation with the predictor variables are (3):
y = 20.005 – 4.264X1 – .271X2 + .434X3 – .822X4 + .686X5 – 9.523X6 – 3.465X7 + 15.471X8
– 1.817X9 + 4.849X10 – 2.410X11 – .101X12 + 4.008X13 + 3.708X14 – 4.564X15 + .697X16
y = 20.005 – 4.264(case position) – .271(team experience) + .434(team difficulty) –
.822(briefing time) + .686(number cases briefed) – 9.523(communication density) –
3.465(tool) + 15.471(location) – 1.817(interruptions) + 4.849(surgeon) –
2.410(anesthesiologist) – .101(CRNA) + 4.008(resident) + 3.708(CST) – 4.564(extra people) +
.697(items per case)
To test the predictive accuracy of the model, reserved data from five surgical cases
was submitted to the general linear regression equation to determine if it could predict the
actual number of non-routine events that occurred in the case. This analysis resulted in a
high root mean squared error (RMSE = 11.56) suggesting the model is not highly
predictive.
(2)
(3)
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CHAPTER 4
DISCUSSION
The section discusses the research results and implications of the relationship
between team preferences for briefing information, actual team briefing characteristics,
and occurrences of non-routine events (NREs). Although the model developed for team
briefings was not found to be predictive of NRE frequency for the data of five reserved
surgical cases, utility can still be derived from the model. Finally, future applications for
the findings and next steps in the research will be proposed.
Surgical Team and Individual Preferences for Briefings
The thirteen interviews revealed a general consensus across team members for
both the purpose of performing team briefings and the critical steps for a good briefing.
The teams were also unified in opinions that briefings should be led by the surgeon, kept
as short as possible, attended by all immediate members of the surgical team, and held
only in the mornings. Such a strong consensus among team members was unexpected
considering that there is no formal briefing protocol for this division.
Almost every person interviewed mentioned that a briefing was important for
“getting on the same page”. Although this is not a technical term, it implies that
establishing a shared understanding of the upcoming surgical procedures may be a critical
component of a quality briefing. This is consistent with previous findings in the literature
that promote the value of shared mental models and shared situational awareness for
improved team performance (Endsley & Jones, 2012; Entin & Serfaty, 1999). Further,
these findings suggest that metrics assessing shared mental models or situational
74
awareness could be appropriate for evaluating the quality of team briefings or the
effectiveness of different briefing implementations.
Further analysis of the interviews revealed that promoting team communication
was not only frequently identified as important but was implicitly included in each one of
the 8 critical steps of a team briefing (Table 5). Each critical step involved the
communication of knowledge for some aspect of the patient or the surgical procedure.
For example, Step 1, “conducting introductions”, would require all team members to
communicate who they are and what their role is on the team. Step 6, “discussing surgeon
preferences”, implies that the surgeon will communicate their preferred methods for the
surgical procedure with the appropriate team members, including things like patient
positioning, specific types of equipment, or perhaps when they want specimens sent to
pathology. So, though team communication is still one of the most cited causes of error in
the operating room (Gawande et al., 2003; Lingard et al., 2004), the findings from these
interviews suggest that surgical teams recognize the importance of communication for
quality team briefings. Thus, briefing interventions designed to promote and facilitate
communication will not only meet team expectations, but would also theoretically
provide the team with additional benefits including improved team cognition (Cooke et
al., 2013) and increased shared mental models (Entin & Serfaty, 1999).
The content from the “8 Critical Steps” was compared to other briefing
implementations that have undergone feasibility evaluations. These items were consistent
with other protocols identified in the literature (Einav et al., 2010; Henrickson et al.,
2009; Lingard et al., 2005; Makary et al., 2007; Papaspyros et al., 2010). However, when
the data were analyzed across individual roles, there were specific topics that emerged as
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being critical specifically for gynecological team briefings, including chance of
proceeding, patient characteristics, and medications. Interestingly, “chance of
proceeding” and “patient characteristics” were not explicitly addressed in any of the other
protocols. In gynecological surgery, there are often many ways the procedure will
proceed once the surgical team has evaluated the patient. An example of “chance of
proceeding” could be that the surgical plan for a particular patient is to start
laparoscopically, however there is a 50% chance that once they begin the procedure they
will see signs of cancer, and if so, the surgical plan will change to an open surgery. This
information was specifically voiced as critical by CSTs and RNs, which is not surprising
since they are responsible for securing appropriate equipment from the core and ensuring
it is ready for potential use. Providing this information at the team briefing, prior to the
surgery, would allow CSTs, RNs, and other team members to plan for equipment that
will be necessary, and thus reduce delays during the surgical procedure. Members of the
anesthesia team commented on the importance of knowledge regarding patient
characteristics at the briefing. Patient characteristics refer to the personality or emotional
state of the patient prior to procedure. The anesthesia team is responsible for interacting
with the patient and keeping them calm prior to initiating anesthetics. Thus, it is helpful
for them to know whether a patient is unusually upset, for example. This information
could only be covered at a briefing as it would depend on the surgeon’s pre-operative
visit and their evaluation of the patient just prior to the surgical procedure.
Overall, the interviews revealed a consensus among team members regarding the
purpose of a briefing and the critical steps for a good briefing. These findings were
consistent with other research, providing further evidence for the appropriateness of these
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items for a briefing protocol. However, it was interesting to see differences between
roles, indicating that a general protocol may be inadequate and implying the importance
of including surgery-specific information.
Implications of Variations in Team Briefings
Twenty four team briefings were observed for 49 surgical cases consisting of
laparoscopic, open, and robotic surgeries. Across the 24 days of data collection, there was
not one day when a briefing did not occur. The briefings were typically led by the
surgeon, and well attended by all team members, except for the anesthesiologist, who
attended less than half of the time. The fact that briefings always occurred and were well
attended could be due to the fact that briefings have been a division practice for two
years. Further, there were two established start times for briefings, depending on the start
time of the first surgical case, thus setting an expectation for where team members should
be at that time.
The observed briefings would cover 1-3 surgical cases and lasted, on average, 3
minutes and 38 seconds. Only an average of 1 minute and 42 seconds is spent discussing
each individual case. The average briefing duration fits with recommendations from the
literature, such as the 2-Minute OR Briefing (Makary, 2007). Although shorter briefing
durations also align with team preferences identified in the interviews, understanding
how variations in briefing duration affect other team briefing characteristics and non-
routine events is critical. For example, putting a “time limit” on the briefing may impede
opportunities for communication to persist. Thus, it will be important to assess how
communication interacts with other briefing variables in the model of team briefings.
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The communication of team briefings revealed a number of variations in structure
and density. First, introductions only occurred in 25% of the briefings, and half of those
occurrences can be attributed to an observer effect whereby introductions were initiated
to present the researchers. Despite recommendations for introductions in the literature
(Russ et al., 2013) and team members viewing introductions as a “critical step”, the
actual practice of introductions was meager.
The findings from the network analysis of communication revealed that the
average team briefings (Figure 2) exhibit a hierarchical structure, with the surgeon
speaking the most frequently and dominating the conversation. On average, team
members only communicated directly with the surgeon or resident and did not speak to
each other during the briefing. The average graph density of individual team briefing
communication networks was 0.46, with the lowest density at 0.21, and the highest
density at 1.00 suggesting a wide range of communication styles are occurring at the
briefings. When the average communication networks for resident-led briefings were
compared with the networks for surgeon-led briefings, there were drastic differences in
the density and structure of the graphs. The average communication network for surgeon-
led briefing displayed a hierarchical structure, with only three team members talking back
to them and no other team members talking to each other. Further, the surgeon-led
briefing network had a density of 0.21 which is equal to the lowest observed individual
team briefing communication network density. On the other hand, the average network
for resident-led briefings displayed a non-hierarchical structure where all team members
communicated back with the resident at least once per briefing and communicated with
each other. As previously mentioned, in this research, denser graphs are assumed to
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equate to better communication. Given that, it is interesting that the residents had better
communication at their briefings when the interviews revealed a strong preference among
team members for surgeon-led briefings. It was not clear from the research exactly why
team members talked more during the resident-led briefings. Team members could have
been asking more questions for clarification or less fearful of speaking up when the
surgeon was not leading.
Implications of Non-Routine Events
Across the 45 observed surgical cases, there were 563 NREs identified by
observers, with an average of approximately 12 NREs per each surgical case. The three
most frequent types of NREs, which accounted for over 80% of all NREs, were related to
external interruptions, teamwork, and equipment.
Further examination of external interruptions revealed that these events most
often included answering phones and pagers or dealing with external visitors coming into
the OR. Although these types of NREs may appear to be inconsequential to the larger
surgical procedure, the findings are consistent with other research which has associated
latent errors to minor NREs (Blocker, 2012; Catchpole, Giddings, Wilkinson, & Hirst et
al., 2007; Wiegmann et al., 2007). Also, the accumulation of many smaller NREs
increases the likelihood that surgical errors will occur (Weinger & Slagle, 2002;
Wiegmann et al., 2007). Thus, a briefing which provides a clear surgical plan and
identifies expectations for how the surgery will proceed can alleviate the potential for
minor NREs to significantly disrupt work flow.
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Teamwork –related NREs were typically categorized as handoffs,
miscommunication among team members, and instances when the surgeon needed to be
provided updates regarding a second OR. These types of NRE’s can be more harmful to
team performance and patient safety. For example, inefficient handoffs have the potential
to result in NREs that compromise patient safety (Blocker, 2012). Further, as previously
mentioned, breakdowns in communication are the number one cited cause of errors in the
OR (Gawande et al., 2003; Lingard et al., 2004). A briefing that establishes good
communication prior to the surgery and outlines a plan for how to proceed regardless of
whether the surgeon is in the room or not could reduce these types of NREs. Also,
documentation of the briefing could be beneficial for reducing negative consequences
from these types of events. For example, it was observed that some RNs took notes
during the morning briefing. If notes or a documentation of the briefing are available
during a handoff, this would facilitate the transfer of knowledge between two team
members and could ensure that no critical information is forgotten in the exchange.
Equipment-related NREs were categorized in three ways including, equipment is
needed and it is not in the room, equipment is needed and it is in the room but it is not
ready to use, or equipment is needed and it is in the room, ready to use, but not working
properly. These types of NREs are consistent with other findings which suggest that
equipment-related disruption events have potential for serious consequences depending
upon the phase of surgery in which they occur (Blocker, 2012; Wadhera et al., 2010).
Interestingly, while “discussing equipment” was talked about during the interviews, it
never emerged as a critical step for briefings. Equipment could easily fall under
“providing the surgical plan”, “discussion surgeon preferences”, or “identifying special
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needs”, but perhaps it needs to be recognized as its own step. A briefing protocol that
explicitly discusses not only which equipment will be needed, but when in the surgical
procedure it should be ready to use could help to reduce this frequently occurring type of
NRE.
The findings revealed that the duration of NREs are typically brief (approximately
40 seconds on average) but can last as long as 34 minutes. The RNs were found to be the
team role that was most often impacted by the occurrence of a NRE, which is consistent
with other research (Blocker, 2012; Henrickson et al., 2010). Interestingly, the whole
team was the second most frequent “role” to be impacted by NREs. Previous research
suggests that NREs which distract the entire surgical team can lead to errors (Wiegmann,
2007). Understanding and considering the types of NREs that tend to impact the whole
team will be critical when developing a briefing implementation that has the potential to
reduce these types of events.
Overall, the results showed that most of the NREs did not have a severe impact on
the surgical work flow. Of the observed NREs, approximately 62% were categorized as
Momentary Delay and 18% were categorized as Acknowledge/No delay. Again, despite
these types of NREs appearing to be non-significant since they do not seriously “delay”
the work flow, as the number of minor NREs increases, so does the probability of error
(Weinger & Slagle, 2002; Wiegmann, 2007). The number of NREs that were categorized
in the most severe level, Full Case Cessation (~2%), appear to be low in comparison to
the other levels. However, if the frequency of these occurrences is averaged across all
briefings, it’s alarming to realize that there would be one Full Case Cessation per surgical
day observed. Further examination of the Full Case Cessation events revealed that these
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disruptions are typically due to team-work related NREs. As teamwork-related NREs
mostly consist of breakdowns in communication, which are known to lead to errors
(Gawande et al., 2003; Lingard et al., 2004), it’s apparent that a briefing intervention
which supports and improves team communication will be valuable for surgical team
performance and ultimately, patient safety.
Impact of the Relationship between Team Briefings and NREs
In the previous section, it was established that there were noteworthy NREs which
disrupted the surgical work flow in gynecological procedures. However, the analysis
above could only assess the impact of the NRE as it occurred in the context of the
surgical procedure. Therefore, to better understand how variations in the team briefing
prior to the surgical procedure could potentially impact the occurrences of NREs,
correlations were computed for quantitative variables and t tests were calculated for
qualitative variables.
The findings from the correlations revealed some interesting relationships
between the briefing characteristics and the measures of NREs including frequency,
severity, and duration. Overall, there were not a high number of significant correlations,
most likely due to a low sample size, however the trends that emerged can still begin to
describe the relationship between briefings and NREs. For example, it was not surprising
that there was a negative correlation between briefing duration and case duration with
NRE frequency, duration, and severity. It should be expected that if less time were spent
on the briefing, there would likely be more disruptions in the subsequent surgeries.
However, this contradicts the preferences revealed in the interviews where most team
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members desired short briefings and also, the trends in the literature which recommend
short protocols (Makary et al., 2007). Although the findings from this research do not
indicate how long a briefing should last, it is apparent that the briefing should be long
enough to be effective. Thus, the aim should not be for briefings to be shorter, but for
briefings to be concise, however long that may take.
There was a negative correlation between communication density and NRE
frequency and severity. This suggests that less communication during the briefing is
associated with more frequent and severe disruptions in the subsequent surgical cases. As
discussed previously, there is much literature that ties communication during a task to
team performance (Cooke, Gorman, & Kiekel, 2008; Cooke & Gorman, 2009). There are
also multiple studies which have shown that merely implementing a briefing reduces
communication breakdowns during surgery (Lingard et al., 2008; Nundy et al., 2008).
However, these results extend these findings by suggesting that the amount and quality of
communication during the actual briefing may also be critical to team performance and
task outcomes.
Interestingly, there was a negative correlation between case position and NRE
frequency, and positive correlations between case position and NRE duration and
severity. As the day goes on, team members are more likely to be fatigued, and cases that
occur later in the day often have different team members, due to handoffs or shift
changes. Thus, it was expected that there would be positive correlations among all three
NRE characteristics. However, when one considers that the most difficult cases of the
day are often listed first, it’s not surprising that more NREs are likely to be observed in
the first case of the day. Further evidence that more difficult cases are associated with
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more frequent NREs was provided by the significant positive correlation between NRE
frequency and the case difficulty ratings provided team members following each surgery.
Previous research suggested that it is more critical to hold a briefing for frequent and
familiar procedures (Einav et al., 2010). However, these findings suggest that good
briefings which allow the team to discuss the surgical plan and anticipations may be more
critical for surgeries which are expected to be more difficult.
When considering the actual team members and their relationship to NREs, it was
surprising to see that the percentage of the surgical team at the briefing was positively
correlated with NRE frequency, duration, and severity. It was expected that if fewer team
members were at the briefing there would be more disruptions throughout the subsequent
surgical case, though since overall attendance by team members was high at the briefings,
the lack of variance could account for this finding. On the other hand, when looking at
the percentage of the team at the briefing that was also present at the start of each case,
there was a negative correlation with NRE frequency. This suggests that when the
surgical case started with few people who were originally present for the briefing, there
was likely to be more NREs of higher severity and duration. Although these correlations
were not statistically significant, this finding could support the recommendation that it is
better to have a briefing before each case when the team members at the briefing will be
guaranteed to be the same team members starting that case.
Much of the previous research on briefings has focused on the implementation of
the briefing and not any consequences from who on the team was present at the briefing.
Thus far, the findings from this study have revealed that who is at the briefing compared
to who is at each surgical case might matter. Additionally, there was a significant
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negative correlation between the number of extra people present at the briefing and NRE
frequency. There were often extra people at team briefings including nurse managers,
additional residents, and core personnel to name a few. This finding suggests that when
there are more “extra people” present at the briefing, there are fewer NREs in the
subsequent surgery. This finding was not surprising as often the additional personnel
provide supportive roles to the surgical team. For example, when core personnel are
present they can listen for additional equipment that might be needed and prepare the
equipment without having to be asked and followed up with by the RN or CST. Another
team-related finding revealed that the experience of the team is negatively correlated with
NRE frequency, severity, and duration. Although these findings were not significant, and
the team experience data often did not include the surgeon, resident, or anesthesiologist,
there is, at the very least, a relationship emerging which suggests that less experienced
teams are associated with more NREs.
The t tests for team briefing characteristics revealed interesting results. When
teams performed introductions, there were significantly fewer NREs that would occur in
the subsequent surgical cases. This finding continues the trend of communication being a
focal component of team briefings and supports previous findings, which suggest
introductions are effective methods for familiarizing team members with each other
(Russ et al., 2013). In fact, Russ et al. (2013) claims that introductions “promote an
individual’s sense of participation and responsibility in the case…increasing the
probability that individuals will speak up if they anticipate or detect a problem. (p. 856)”
Providing further evidence that variations in team briefing communication affect
the subsequent surgery, it was found that when the resident leads the briefing there are
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significantly fewer NREs. This finding is important because it supports earlier claims in
this research stating that greater graph density is associated with better communication.
On average, the team briefing communication networks for the residents display greater
density and here, resident-led briefings are also associated with significantly fewer NREs
than surgeon-led briefings. Therefore, future briefing interventions should not only be
designed to promote more communication but should consider the specific
communication style of residents.
Finally, the t tests revealed that when multiple surgeons briefed on different cases
for the same operating room, there were significantly more NREs in subsequent surgical
cases. The interviews revealed that surgeon preferences are a critical step in the team
briefing process. However, having to account for and adapt to different surgeon
preferences in one briefing could create an information overload. Thus, this finding could
again be evidence that briefings before each surgery would be more beneficial to team
cognitive functioning and to team performance.
Impact of the Model for Team Briefings
The principle component regression revealed a model for predicting NRE
frequency based on attributes of team briefings in gynecological surgery. Principle
component regression analysis effectively reduced the inherent multicollinearity in the
data and decreased the number of selected predictor variables from an initial 26 to 16
significant variables. These variables included case position, briefing duration, the
number of cases briefed, communication density, the briefing leader, the briefing tool, the
briefing location, the number of interruptions, extra people present, team experience,
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team difficulty ratings, the number of items discussed per case, and whether or not the
surgeon, anesthesiologist, CRNA, resident, and CST were present at the briefing.
The predictor variables residing in the model as expected include, case position,
briefing duration, communication, extra people, ratings of team difficulty, and team
experience were all previously discussed above. The effects and potential implications for
each of these predictors were discussed in detail above. The only other predictable
predictor variable was the number of cases briefed. This variable has a negative
coefficient in the model suggesting that when more cases are discussed at a single
briefing, there are likely to be more NREs which occur. This finding suggests that
discussing multiple cases during one briefing could be an overload of information for
team members and critical knowledge could be forgotten by the time the subsequent
surgical case begins. On the other hand, as the number of cases briefed increases, the
briefing leader may feel more pressure to fit more information regarding each case into a
short amount of time, thus omitting critical details.  Further, team members change
throughout the day due to handoffs and shift changes. If there are a high number of cases
that occur, it is more likely that the team present at the briefing could be on a break or
have gone home by the time the subsequent surgical cases begin. This finding provides
more support for holding briefing prior to each surgical case.
Some of the predictor variables in the model were surprising. For example, it was
unexpected that the surgeon, resident, CST, and CRNA were included in the model
because all team members, except for the anesthesiologist, had good attendance (80-90%)
for the team briefings. With such low variance, these variables were not expected to
provide any predictive value in the model. The inclusion of the tool and location were
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also unexpected because t tests revealed that there was not a significant difference for
briefing tool (e.g. SHA or memory) used or whether the briefing took place in the
hallway or in the OR. The relationship that emerged between interruptions and NRE
frequency was also unanticipated. Again interruptions included team members answering
pagers/phones during the briefing, arriving late or leaving abruptly, or people walking
through the briefing. The coefficient for the variable was negative suggesting fewer
interruptions during the briefing are associated with more NREs. The researcher had
expected that more interruptions during the briefing would have been associated with
more NREs as team members could have been distracted during the briefing and missed
pertinent information. Finally, the fact that the number of items per case was included in
the model with a positive correlation to NRE frequency was puzzling. It was expected
that an increase in the number of items discussed would be associated with a decrease in
NREs as, theoretically, more information would be communicated at the team briefing.
Perhaps, the content and conciseness of information is more important than quantity of
information for an effective briefing.
Ultimately, this model was not highly predictive of NRE frequency. Using
reserved data for 5 surgical cases, the predictive accuracy of the model was tested
revealing a high mean squared error. Additional analyses have revealed that poor
predictive accuracy of the model could be result of a lack of power due to low sample
size. Following the development of the model and predictive accuracy testing, the
G*Power analysis program for testing the power of the multiple regression model (Faul,
Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007; Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009) was
employed to assess power. The power analysis suggested that a sample size between 70 –
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143 would be needed to achieve a power of .80 and a medium to large effect size. The
sample size available for the development of this model was 45 surgical cases. Thus,
obtaining a higher sample size could increase the predictive accuracy of the model.
Another potential contributor to the low predictive accuracy could include
predictor variable selection. Given that development of the team briefing model for
gynecological surgery was an exploratory attempt at building a model to describe team
briefings and predict outcomes in subsequent surgeries, all observable and available data
points were used to create the model. Whereas only predictors that were statistically
significant were included in the final equation, statistical significance does not always
indicate predictive value (Hyndman & Athanasopoulos, 2013). This could explain why
the various team members were included in the model even though they were essentially
always at the briefings, and thus their presence was not very predictive of NRE outcomes.
Further, Kachigan (1991) cautions that often, predictor variables are chosen that are not
actually predictive and yet, these can still be selected for inclusion in the regression
equation based purely on chance relationships. If this occurs, it’s possible that these
variables are interacting with each other in ways that decrease the predictive accuracy of
the model (Kachigan, 1991).
Finally, the fact that the model is not significantly predictive does not mean the
model is not useful. In fact there are a number of things that can be learned from the
model. For example, the model is predictive with regard to the set of data that was used
to build it. Thus, it is useful in understanding the observed behavior for these team
briefings and how different variables interact. Further, coefficients of the different
variables in the model can be compared in turn to see different relationships emerge and
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how changes in one variable seemingly affect the rest. As with other models in cognitive
science, this research has established a starting point for a continuing line of research
from which to pose new questions, test new hypotheses, and provide an initial method for
organizing data and findings.
Real World Applications
This study generated a large number of findings regarding team briefings and
non-routine events. The findings from this study will not only contribute to the growing
field of empirical studies for team briefings in the operating room, but will be used to
develop new practices that can be implemented immediately to improve surgical team
processes. From the results of this study, there were three important trends that will be
relied on to provide recommendations for the development of a briefing protocol in the
Division of Gynecological Surgery at Mayo Clinic.
The first recommendation is to promote and facilitate communication during the
briefing among all surgical team members. As seen from the resident-led briefings and
introductions, when all members participate it less likely that NREs will occur in the
subsequent surgeries. This can be accomplished in a briefing protocol by requiring
introductions take place and by making each team member responsible for providing or
verifying certain information relevant to their position throughout the briefing. For
example, the CST should be responsible for reporting what equipment will be pulled and
prepped for the upcoming case. The surgeon can then verify this equipment is correct and
provide any additional instructions or preferences.
90
Second, briefings should be conducted prior to the start of each surgical case
instead of only in the morning prior to all surgical cases. The findings regarding case
position, number of cases briefed, multiple surgeons briefing together, and whether team
members at the briefing were also present at the start of the case suggested that holding a
briefing which only covers one surgical case at a time may be more beneficial. This
recommendation also satisfies the finding that longer briefings are more likely to be
associated with fewer NREs. If teams are not trying to squeeze in discussion of multiple
surgeries at one time, they may be more likely to discuss the surgical case in depth, which
aids in accomplishing the first recommendation of promoting team communication.
The final recommendation is for attendance to be mandatory by all immediate
surgical team members. Previous research has only suggested that representatives for the
surgeon, anesthesiologist, and nursing are necessary at the briefing (Makary et al., 2007).
The findings in this study revealed that communication of all team members is important
and that the team present at the briefing should also be the team present at the surgery. To
comply with these findings, it is important for all team members to be present at the
briefing. This study also found that extra people at the briefings were also associated with
fewer NREs, the protocol should also encourage supporting staff to attend briefings. For
example, core personnel could be present at cases that are expected to be difficult and
may require lots of different equipment. Similarly, to account for the fact that less
experienced teams tend to be associated with more NREs, RN managers and CRNA
managers should be present at team briefings with newer surgical team members so that
they can provide necessary support.
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Limitations
Although this study has revealed a number of interesting and potentially impactful
findings, caution should be taken before extrapolating these results. The findings are
based on a small number of observed briefings and surgical cases at a single institution
that were available to the researcher as a sample of convenience. Whereas convenience
sampling can be criticized for being biased and not representative of the larger
population, in this case it provided an opportunity to study real teams in context, which
does provide a validity that cannot always be achieved in laboratory studies. Further, this
research answers the call for more empirical work studying teams “in the wild” (Salas,
Cooke, & Rosen, 2008). As little information is still known about how teams interact in
real, live, uncontrolled environments (Salas et al., 2008), this research was critical for
understanding how surgical teams adapt and respond to dynamical changes in team
briefings.
Although observations and video-recording were always announced to the
surgical team, it’s possible that the mere presence of the observer confounded the normal
surgical work flow for that team. For example, this was observed during the briefings
when the surgeon would begin introductions as a way to present the researcher observing
for the day. There was also only one researcher at a time prospectively recording NREs
and retrospectively coding team briefing characteristics. Although researchers achieved a
high level of inter-rater reliability for the coding of NREs, when 1 observer is present,
they can only attend to so many things at a time and thus may not have captured all NREs
or all details of NREs that occurred. Finally, even though it was not possible to track
surgical teams and individual surgical members and all participants came from the same
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division, there was a considerable diversity in the participant group (e.g. multiple
surgeons, multiple residents, etc.). Also, there were no repeat observations of one
completely identical surgical team.
Future Research
As with all research, the findings from this study are not definitive; there is much
more work to be done. Although the model of team briefings was not found to be
predictive of NRE frequency for the reserved data in this study, future work should
continue to revise and refine the model. This could involve increasing the power for
predictive accuracy by collecting more data. Similarly, continued research could
investigate using alternative methods to narrow down or amend the selection of inputs to
the model, ensuring a substantial relationship between the predictor variables and the
criterion variable. For example, the content and type of the items discussed at each
briefing are likely to be more valuable than just the quantity of items discussed. This
would require further research, likely with subject matter experts, to analyze and
operationalize different types of content discussed at team briefings. Additional research
will also be needed to determine whether all of the findings can be generalized across
different fields of surgery or whether briefings should in fact be surgery specific.
Future studies will be needed to evaluate the efficacy of briefing protocols or
interventions derived from the findings in this research. For example, the
recommendations provided above would require more research to ensure there would be
no unintended consequences from changing the current practice. For example, mandating
attendance could be difficult for surgeons who are running a second OR and thus may
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have to interrupt their surgery in order to attend. It could also be found that people are
better at preparing for upcoming surgeries when they are briefed in the morning and can
take care adapt plans as things related to the surgery may change throughout the day.
Finally, it will be important that this research is eventually examined as one
component of a larger system of orientation events. Although this research looked at the
local affects between variations in team briefings and outcomes in subsequent surgeries,
that other orientation events may also be affected by team briefings or interacting briefing
information to impact outcomes. For example, the quality of team briefings may affect
the quality of the time-out, the reliability of a handoff, or even determine the
requirements for a debriefing. Studying each of these orientation events in concurrently
will provide a more accurate account of teamwork in the operating room.
94
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this research was to increase understanding of team briefings in
the operating room. Specifically, the aim was to determine how variations in the quality
of team briefing characteristics affected team-related outcomes in subsequent surgical
procedures. Further, this research was the first to explore that relationship between team
briefings and team-related outcomes by developing a model for team briefings.
Cognitive interviews were conducted with surgical team members to better
understand important information surrounding briefings and prospective observations
generated data for 24 briefings and 45 surgical cases. Variations in communication were
found to be critically associated with the occurrence of non-routine events (NREs). When
team briefings were led by residents, had greater density in their communication
networks (e.g. more communication), or conducted introductions there were significantly
fewer NREs which occurred in subsequent surgical procedures. The timing of the
briefing was also found to be important and findings revealed that when more cases were
briefed or multiple surgeons briefed at the same time, there were likely to be more NREs
in subsequent procedures. Finally, the attendance of surgical team members at the
briefing appears to have a substantial relationship to NREs. When all surgical team
members were at the briefing and also at the start of the surgical case or when supporting
staff attended, there were fewer NREs observed in the following procedures.
This study suggests that team briefings are associated with more communication.
Across the literature, greater communication been widely shown to support teamwork by
increasing team cognition, facilitating shared mental models and situation awareness, and
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aiding in prospective memory. The ability to support and improve team cognitive
functioning and performance in the operating room is critical for maintaining high
standards of safe patient care and reducing the opportunities for errors to occur.
This study produced feasible recommendations that can be immediately
implemented into the practice of briefings and used to support the development of a
formal briefing protocol. Future studies will be needed to evaluate the efficacy and
effectiveness of team briefing interventions. More research in general is needed to
continue understanding how briefings can prove more beneficial to team functioning for
the subsequent surgery and understanding how briefings, in relation to all other
orientation events, can positively affect surgical team performance.
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Survey 1: After Pre-briefing
1. During the team briefing, which of the following items were discussed? (Circle all that apply)
a. Patient name f. What to Anticipate
b. Patient Age g. Additional information not on SHA
c. Patient History h. Equipment requests
d. Diagnosis i. Additional concerns for surgeon, resident, or anesth.
e. Surgical Procedure j. Other, please specify ___________________
2. What do you believe should have been mentioned or included in the team briefing cases?
3. If there were multiple cases discussed during the team briefing, which case do you remember the most information
about? (Circle all that apply)
a. Case #1
b. Case #2
c. Case #3
d. Case #4
4. Of the cases selected above, why do you remember so much about the case(s)? (Circle all that apply)
a. The amount of detail provided during the team briefing
b. It’s a complicated case(s)
c. It’s the first or last case(s) of the day
d. I will only work in this case(s)
e. It’s a familiar case
f. Not enough details were provided about the case(s)
g. Other, please specify _________________________
5. What do you remember from the team briefing about Case #1 specifically? (Circle all that apply)
a. Patient name f. What to Anticipate
b. Patient Age g. Additional information not on SHA
c. Patient History h. Equipment requests
d. Diagnosis i. Additional concerns for surgeon, resident, or anesth.
e. Surgical Procedure j. Other, please specify ___________________
6. Gender?          Male         Female
7. What is your role?      Surgeon      Resident    Nurse    CSA    CST   CRNA   Anesthesiologist
8. How long have you been in this role?
9. Do you normally work in gynecology?          Yes          No
122
Survey 2: After Case #1
1. Compared to other similar surgeries, how difficult was that surgery? Please rate from 0% (not difficult at all) to 100%
(most difficult surgery of that kind I’ve done to date). Mark your rating below.
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
2. How close would you say the actual surgical procedure matched the expectations you had based on the information
you were given during the morning team briefing? Please rate from 0% (no match between pre-surgery expectation
and actual surgery) to 100% (total match between pre-surgery expectation and actual surgery). Mark your rating
below.
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
3. What do you believe should have been mentioned or included in the team briefing about this case that wasn’t?
4. During the time-out, do you remember the surgeon/resident reciting the following items? (circle all that apply)
a. Patient Name d. Surgical Procedures
b. Mayo Clinic Number e. Allergies
c. Date of Birth f. Antibiotics
5. What do you believe should have been mentioned or included in the time-out about this case that wasn’t?
6. Information presented at the morning team briefing helped you in managing this surgical case?
Strongly Agree Agree Neither Agree
nor Disagree
Disagree Strongly
Disagree
7. The time-out helped refresh your memory regarding information presented about this case at the morning team
briefing.
Strongly Agree Agree Neither Agree
nor Disagree
Disagree Strongly
Disagree
8. What do you remember from the team briefing about your next case?
a. Patient name f. What to Anticipate
b. Patient Age g. Additional information not on SHA
c. Patient History h. Equipment requests
d. Diagnosis i. Additional concerns for surgeon, resident, or anesth.
e. Surgical Procedure j. Other, please specify ___________________
k. NO NEXT CASE
